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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Chinese authoritarian and conservative political system, Chinese political efficacy 
and political participation are popular directions of research in recent years. Based on uses and 
gratifications theory and self-efficacy theory, this thesis explored the relationships among social 
media use, political efficacy, and political participation. The most important part of this study 
was examining the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political 
participation in mainland China. Internal political efficacy and external political efficacy are two 
dimensions of political efficacy that were separately examined in this study. The results revealed 
that internal political efficacy can mediate between social media use and political participation. 
However, external political efficacy cannot mediate social media use and political participation. 
The additional findings are related to gender, age, and educational level. Chinese males scored 
higher on average in social media use, internal political efficacy, and political participation than 
females. Chinese females measured a higher on external political efficacy score than males. In 
addition, Chinese young adults have more social media use related to politics than older adults. 
On the other hand, Chinese older adults have higher internal political efficacy and external 
political efficacy than younger adults. Furthermore, higher educational level is a strong predictor 
of political participation.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction  
With the development of Internet and social media, China has changed gradually in 
different realms. This is so particularly in the political realm which has become more and more 
important for scholars to research in China. Social media is a useful platform to engage citizens’ 
participation in political activities in democratic countries and even transitional countries (Zhang 
& Lin, 2014). In 2016, China had 731 million Internet users, which was an increase of 42.99 
million from 2015 (China Internet Watch, 2017; Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China, 2017). Due to increasing Internet access, Chinese people have more devices to use the 
Internet. The mobile phone is the dominant access that Chinese people use the Internet. Mobile 
Internet users in China were 695 million at the end of 2016 (China Internet Watch, 2017).  
  Mobile access provides more opportunities to Chinese people to use social media. In 2016, 
China had 730 million active social media users (Chozan, 2017). For these statistics, social 
media play an important role in Chinese civic society, especially in political realms. Social media 
usage changes the information accessed, types of political participation and cyber-citizens' 
political efficacy (Hill & Hughes, 1999; Zhao & Leung, 2013). Chinese citizens have more 
opportunities to get political information and knowledge from social media than the era when 
traditional media was dominant. Through increasing political knowledge, and more political 
discussions on social media, Chinese people will increase their confidence in political realms, 
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which influence their political behaviors and participations (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Gil, Jung, and 
Valenzuela (2012) investigated consuming news on social media influence on political 
participation such as voting. They found that the people who use social media frequently for 
news have more active political participation than the people who use less social media. On the 
other hand, the Chinese government also uses social media to communicate with citizens, such as 
disseminating policies and perceiving citizens’ suggestions (Shao& Wang, 2017). There are 
53,546 governmental official accounts on Weibo which is most popular social networking site in 
China, and more than 32% of citizens got the e-governmental services (Statistical Report on 
Internet Development in China, 2017).  
In past studies, scholars examined the Internet, social media, or social networking sites 
use influence political participation. However, few researches have investigated the functions of 
political efficacy between social media use and political participation in the context of Mainland 
China. Consequently, based on use and gratification theory, social cognitive theory and self-
efficacy theory, this research will examine the mediating role of political efficacy between social 
media use and political participation in Mainland China. In addition, the process of Chinese 
citizens changing their political behaviors through social media use and change of political 
efficacy will be analyzed by theoretical and practical explanations. Furthermore, because of 
special political context in China, social media use about politics, political efficacy and political 
participation have different implications from western countries. As a result, under the authority 
of the Chinese Communist Party, the meanings of social media use related to politics will also be 
analyzed in discussions and implications. These questions will be examined.  
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Background 
Chinese Political System and Democratic Process 
According to the Country Review of China (2016), with the decline of the last Chinese 
Qing Dynasty in 1644, Chinese people gradually realized that China was behind the western 
countries. The First Opium War that happened between Qing Dynasty and United Kingdom was 
related to international trade, territorial dispute, and diplomatic relations (Tsang, 2007). 
Although Chinese people had awareness during that period, the Chinese government was not 
aware of the importance of technology and the necessity for transformation. In 1898, Kang 
Youwei and Liang Qichao led the Hundred Days' Reform Movement that attracted many 
Chinese elites who advocated westernized culture, economy, and political institutions to change 
traditional China (Fang, 2014). Many Chinese people wanted to reform China during that time. 
During the Revolution of 1911, most of the provinces broke away from governing Qing Dynasty. 
In December 1911, Sun Yat-sen became president of the interim government. When the last 
emperor Pu Yi abdicated, Chinese feudal monarchy political system was replaced with a republic 
political system led by a president and built by Chinese Nationalist People's Party, which was the 
real beginning of Modern China and the first step toward democracy in China. After some 
warlords fought for centralized power, Sun Yat-sen who led the Chinese Nationalist People's 
Party (CNPP) aligned with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and started to reform the old 
China (Country Review of China, 2016). Although the CCP and CNPP continued battling for a 
long time under the table even open hostilities, they made efforts to unite during the Japanese 
invasion of China between 1937 and 1945.  
In 1949, the CCP established the People's Republic of China on the mainland. Due to 
long term turmoil and wars, China needed to recover in all realms, including economy, politics, 
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culture, and social institutions. The more important thing is that Chinese people had more 
democratic power than during the feudal monarchy even though the CCP centralized power to 
the party, which controlled local communities directly (Country Review of China, 2016). During 
1952 to 1956, CCP led citizens in socialist transformation, which means the CCP and citizens 
tried to eliminate the feudal influence and transform industry, agriculture, and technology. On 
the other hand, China did not completely change to democratic country. Chinese government just 
use one party political system replaced monarchy, and still used centralized political system 
(Zhong, 2007). In 1966, Mao Zedong led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which led to 
a dark time for the Chinese people who became radical revolutionaries criticizing capitalism and 
cultural elites.  
At the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China needed once again a full 
recovery of development in every area, most importantly in the economy. In 1978, Deng 
Xiaoping, as the leader, established the reform and opening-up policy that promoted the Chinese 
economy dramatically. The government opened foreign trade, and encouraged private enterprises 
and decreased central government control (Country Review of China, 2016). In this period, 
Chinese people had more freedom than before, and cultural development was getting peak. On 
the other hand, because the speed of development was so fast, the problems of economic 
inequality, immigration security, and political elites' corruption led some students to be 
dissatisfied. In 1989, many people participated in a protest to resist political officers' corruption 
and seek further reform (Country Review of China, 2016). The government suppressed the 
Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, in which 86% of the population advocated democratic 
development (Wang, 2007). Although this protest had some negative influence on government 
administration, it began the transformation of Chinese people from being conservative and 
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acquiescent into protesters, which promoted democratic power in China and increased the speed 
of economic development. 
Since the 1990s, successive Chinese governments have not only promoted economy but 
also developed democratic administrations that explore human rights (Semenov, 2016). For 
instance, the government liberalized criminal legislation and abolished correctional labor camps. 
At the same time, the Chinese government tried to include the vote for multi candidate party 
secretaries, and also involved merchants. Furthermore, the CCP built in feedback mechanisms to 
increase the transparency of the government (Semenov, 2016). Although China studied from 
western countries implemented open markets and advance political institutions, it did not 
completely follow western policies. It still insisted centralized control by one party, which was 
appropriate for Chinese national condition, including multiple ethnic, unequal economic 
development and cultural background.  
Due to the dramatic development of the economy, China was facing many issues, 
including national unification, national security, international relations, pollution, education, and 
especially corruption among government officers (Yeoh, 2015). Corruption is a serious problem 
blocking Chinese democratic progress in this era. Large-scale administration of government 
officers' corruption has been an issue from the reform and opening-up policy that was announced 
in 1978 to now, and the serious administration was after Xi Jinping became president. An Anti-
corruption campaign has developed throughout China. The Chinese government has not only 
punished local low hierarchy officers but has also arrested central highest-level hierarchy officers 
(Yeoh, 2015). Recently, an anti-corruption television series titled In the Name of People was 
very popular in China. There are many real corruption cases in this television series. The first 
week when In the Name of People was released, the audience rating was the top one in that 
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month, exceeding the most popular shows. The high-level attention to this program probably 
means that the public would like to pay attention to political issues, and probably has a passion to 
participate in politics. 
According to Siebert’s (1956) authoritarian theory of the press, the government through 
the mass media especially the press to achieve authoritarian social control. Authoritarian 
countries have media monopoly and absolute political restraint (Siebert, 1956). China is a 
country where the press was completely controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, especially 
in the era of traditional media. The main function of the press is to support government 
administration and control.  
Furthermore, with the development of the four theories of the press, Ostini and Fung 
(2002) examined the new model of the national media system. The model combines the political 
system of states (democratic and authoritarian) and journalistic values (liberal and conservative). 
The specific four dimensions of the model are democratic-liberal, democratic-conservative, 
authoritarian-liberal, and authoritarian-conservative. Democratic-liberal systems emphasize free 
speech, which is supported by both the political system and individual journalists. While 
democratic-conservative systems promote freedom in the political realm, they emphasize more 
restrictive professional media practices. The journalists who work in this social context should 
support the current social structure. Authoritarian-conservative systems officially restrain content 
of all types of media. Journalistic professional values in this system are marked by a lack of 
freedom of speech. Authoritarian-liberal systems have restrictive political structures, but allow 
for a high degree of media freedom of expression.  
Each of these four systems has a prototypical example country. China belongs to the 
authoritarian political system and the conservative journalistic value. By contrast the United 
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States follows the democratic-liberal system. However, other Asian regions do not have the 
system as China. Japan follows a democratic state system with conservative journalistic values. 
Although Hong Kong belongs to Mainland China in the political realm and has authoritarian 
political system, it also has a liberal journalistic value.  
Based on this model, it is obvious that China has restraints from both the political system 
and journalistic value. Authoritarian and conservative characteristics restrain Chinese journalists' 
reporting. It is important that Chinese political system and social value were influenced by 
Confucianism. Confucianism as a rationalistic philosophy and ideology has influenced Chinese 
political, military, social economic and cultural realm (Yao, 2000). It initiated and developed 
during the Hundred Schools of Thought by Confucius who is a famous philosopher and educator. 
In Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), the emperor advocated Confucianism, and it became the 
official mainstream ideology in that period (Yao, 2000). Although Chinese ideology infused 
diverse philosophical cultures, Confucianism still kept its significant influence in Chinese society 
even to now. Confucianism emphasized national unity, patriotic and loyalty to the nation and the 
emperor, and positive moral value (Fukuyama, 1995). This core values helped ancient 
dominators centralize power in the central governments, which still influences contemporary 
China (Jensen, 1997).  
However, with the development of social media, the environment of Chinese journalism 
and political atmosphere are changed. Social media provides more opportunities for Chinese 
citizens to pay attention to, communicate, and participate in politics, which increases citizens' 
confidence in the political realm. Unlike traditional media, the characteristics of social media 
also provide a comfortable environment for citizens to express their own opinion. Although the 
Chinese government still has the strict supervision and the censorship power on social media, 
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social media is a significant contributor to the expanding citizens’ liberal rights and facilitating 
political democracy.  
 
Development of Internet and social media in China 
In order to understand the development of social media in China, understanding the 
development of the Internet in China is an essential phase. Back to history, Internet development 
in China has four phases. First, from 1986 to 1992, Internet was seldom used in researches of 
computer and sending emails (Yu, Asur, & Huberman, 2011). The second phase was from 1992 
to 1995. During this period, the Chinese government set up several major Internet projects, 
which built the foundation of national network information (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The 
third phase was from 1995 to 1997, when the Chinese government made efforts to develop IT 
industry, which brings enormous benefits for China (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The fourth 
phase is from 1998 to present. Internet became the prevalent powerful medium in Chinese 
society, which change the predominant position of traditional media, such as television, radio, 
and newspaper (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012).  
With the development of online media and popularization of mobile access, China has 
more and more people to use online media through the Internet. According to the Statistical 
Report on Internet Development in China (2017), China had 731 million Internet users, which is 
3.1% points higher than the world average and 7.6 % points higher than the Asian average. The 
news is the useful way to get information about politics. At the end of 2016 China had 614 
million people who read news on the Internet, particularly on mobile devices. 82.2% of mobile 
Internet users read the news on mobile devices (Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China, 2017).  
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With the development of Internet and influences of western social media, China 
gradually had its own social media. Different types of social media have different characteristics 
and users. The first type is blogging platforms. Blogging began in 2005 in China. There were 
more than 300 million users blogging by the end of 2011. The popular blogging platforms are 
wordpress.com, blogger.com, posterous.com, blog.sina.com.cn, blog.sohu.com, hi.baidu.com 
(Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The second type of social media is social networking sites. QQ 
(similar to SSN), RenRen (similar to Facebook), WeChat (similar to WhatsApp) and Douban 
(the stage of cultural comment and communication) are essential and prevalent social networks 
in China. Among these Chinese social networking sites, WeChat is most popular and has the 
highest influence. It was released in 2011. Mobile App of WeChat has the highest rate of usage 
among social networking sites in China (Gan, 2017). The third type is micro blogging platforms, 
such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo. Sina Weibo which was launched at 2009, is the most 
prevalent micro blogging platform. It is similar to Twitter, which can post text, pictures, voice, 
videos, music, and links. It also has functions such as comment, group discussion and private 
chat (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). Unlike Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo has no bigger 
influence in recent years. Sina Weibo predominates the Weibo market in China. Moreover, 
compared to Sina Weibo, users of Tencent Weibo have lower education level (Ingrid Fischer-
Schreiber, 2012).   
 
Functions of social media in the political realm in China 
Social media is the most influential factor in the political realms in different countries 
(Effing, Van Hillegersberg, & Huibers, 2011). It positively associates with citizens’ political 
participation. Social media is an essential contributor of spreading news and relative information. 
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News exposure is significantly related to political knowledge and discussion on social media 
influences political participation (Trepte & Schmitt, 2017). Social networking sites among social 
media are promoting information seeking and discussion about the news. According to the 
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (2017), the top three important social 
networking sites in China are WeChat Moments, Weibo and Qzone. Weibo is the most popular 
social networking site for news reading and discussion. According to the survey of social media 
use in 2011, individuals' average usage time on social networking sites is 4.18 per day (Li, 2011). 
In 2016, social networking sites are more popular platforms used to discuss social issues than 
news websites and traditional media (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017). 
Because of the impact of social media, traditional media have tried to revival the influence that 
they have lost (Huang, & Lu, 2017). For example, CCTV News launched its official account on 
Weibo in November 2012. According to a report from CCTV Research and Development Center, 
CCTV’s official Weibo account attracted more than 2.1 million followers at the end of 2015, and 
the follower is increasing 15 million in this year.  
More importantly, social media has gradually changed Chinese political culture and 
manner in which government communication with citizens (Shao& Wang, 2017). The 
government uses social media to disseminate policies and connect with citizens. In 2016, 
Chinese president Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese Communist Party needed to reform its 
method of communication with citizens from government-oriented to audience-oriented, which 
combines traditional media and new media. Following the lead of the central government, local 
e-governments were gradually set up on Weibo and WeChat. Until December 2016, 32.7% of 
citizens received e-government services, and there were 53,546 account names with the suffix 
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“gov.cn” (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017). About 78% of users’ 
satisfaction level with the government service exceeded medium. 
In addition, social media provides more opportunities to citizens to participate in politics 
in China. First, the basic reality is that Chinese citizens cannot easily get real information from 
mainstream media (Tai & Sun, 2007). Social media as an alternative resource for users not only 
provides more possibility of seeking information, but also ensure that users are more independent 
and able to understand, create, and supervise government activities (Shao& Wang, 2017). 
Citizens have gradually begun to realize that they have rights and access to express and 
participate in politics, which creates value to others, even society. This change is extremely 
important for Chinese people’s participatory democracy. Second, due to social media, Chinese 
citizens have become grassroots reporters and participate in discussions of public affairs, even 
politics (Zhou, 2009). Social media provide powerful access for Chinese citizens to engage in 
grassroots journalism in reporting public events, supervising officials, and participating or 
organizing discussions on public affairs (Gillmor, 2004). Third, social media promotes regional 
connections in mainland China that even expands to the global sphere. From the domestic 
perspective, local government depends on social media to achieve effective cooperation and 
supervision. From the global perspective, social media not only promotes the national image and 
international relationships but also increases the connection between domestic people and 
Chinese diasporas (Shao& Wang, 2017).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Uses and Gratifications Theory 
Uses and gratifications theory is the basic theoretical framework in mass communication, 
which can be used in different types of media. It investigates people’s motivation for information 
seeking and acquisition (Weaver Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011). Back to the origin of 
uses and gratifications theory, Lazarsfeld’s and Stanton’s (1942) research focused on the 
intention of demanding content of media, such as newspaper and radio. Uses and gratifications 
theory emphasizes people’s functions is related to media rather than functions of media to people 
(Katz, 1959). Katz (1959) also states that individual’s interest, values, and social status are 
essential factors in choosing certain media. For mass media, uses and gratifications theory 
research that people’s cognitions such as emotions, wishes, and motivations influence the 
behaviors of media consumption (McQuail, 2005). However, with the development of 
technology and the Internet, uses and gratifications theory expanded the scope of its investigation 
from the traditional media to new media. Social media as a strong interactivity online media 
provides more choices and motivations for users (Whiting & Williams, 2013). Social interaction, 
information seeking, and relaxation are the basic scale of the uses and gratifications approach to 
measure people’s purposes in using social media (Ko et al., 2005).  
With research on uses and gratifications theory, in order to explain people’s motivations 
shaping more deeply, study specific realms of information content is necessary especially in 
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related to news and politics (Vincent & Basil, 1997; Levy, 1977; Blumler & McQuail, 1968). 
Kaye and Johnson (2002) found that people sought political information to satisfy their 
motivation and gratifications because they wanted political guidance and supervision. They also 
found that political interests and intention of supervision are positively related to political 
information seeking. Chen (2017) utilized uses and gratifications approach to examine the 
purposes in which Chinese people use WeChat and the relationship between WeChat use and 
political engagement in China. Although the previous study showed that social network usage 
was positively associated with seeking entertainment and negatively associated with political 
engagement, this study found that WeChat usage was positively related to levels of political 
participation, and promoted the reposting of political news even increasing comment and 
expression on WeChat (Shah et al., 2001; Chen, 2017).  
 
Social Cognitive Theory  
With the development of mass media, it is important to understand human cognition 
thoughts and behaviors during the process of using media (Bandura, 2001). Social cognitive 
theory provides a conceptual framework to explain how personal, behavioral and environmental 
determinants influence each other (Bandura,1986).  
 
Figure 1. Schematization of triadic reciprocal causation in the causal model of social cognitive 
theory 
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In the above model of Social Cognitive Theory, personal, environmental, and behavioral 
determinants influence each other. In political communication, audiences’ personalities, political 
interests, political knowledge, educational background, and media literacy will influence their 
political behaviors, such as browsing news, seeking political information, and political 
participation, which changes the local political atmosphere and even the national political 
environment. On the other hand, political environment can also affect audiences’ political 
behaviors even their political interests and knowledge.  
Based on this model of reciprocal causation, Bandura (2001) further explained the 
mechanisms of governing observational learning. There are four phases of mechanisms of 
governing observational learning: attentional processes, retention processes, production 
processes and motivational processes (Bandura, 2001). Utilizing political communication as the 
example, in the attentional process, when people pay attention to political information, they will 
keep the information in their mind depending on their cognitive skill, value preferences, bias, 
and affective elements (Bandura, 2001). In the retention process, people actively dispose 
political information and match it with the concept and rules in their mind. In the production 
process, people transform the conception to behaviors, such as paying attention to similar 
political information, political information seeking and political participation (Bandura, 2001). In 
the motivational process, people will have motivations to have intentions or realistic actions 
through different types of incentives: external, vicarious and self-evaluative incentives (Bandura, 
2001). In other words, when people see this political information again, they will receive 
incentives, which can promote motivations for their actions.  
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Self-Efficacy 
In order to investigate political efficacy, self-efficacy of social cognitive theory is 
important. Bandura (1977) has claimed that self-efficacy is the power that changes individuals’ 
expectations of success. It also refers to people have confidence in their ability to perform some 
things (Bandura, 1994). It is the significant determinant of behavioral change (Sherer et al., 
1982). The level of outcome expectations is the core factor that influences the possibility of 
success (Bandura, 1977). However, the outcome expectation is not the sole determinant of 
behavior change. Individuals’ success needs to combine expectations, incentives, appropriate 
knowledge and capability to achieve (Bandura, 1977). Bandura (1997) supplemented some 
content in the mechanism of behavior change. The individual who has a different level and 
strength of self-efficacy will bring a different degree of behavior change, and different types of 
outcome experiences such as physical, social, and self-evaluative experiences will have different 
realistic outcomes. In other words, if a person has a high level of self-efficacy and positive 
physical, social experiences and high self-evaluation, this person will be better able to attaining 
the positive outcome. In the political realm, if people have positive experiences with political 
knowledge or relative things, they will have high self-evaluation on politics, which leads to 
positive outcomes from political participation.  
Specifically, self-efficacy needs four processes to be activated. The first process is the 
cognitive process. Cognitions control actions. People use their efficacy and relative thoughts 
govern behaviors and outcomes. People who have high self-efficacy usually have positive and 
successful expectations, but people who have low self-efficacy usually have negative and failed 
perceptions (Bandura, 1994). The second process is motivation process. The level of self-
regulations of motivation depends on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1994). Different people have 
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different levels of self-regulation and motivation. Self-efficacy organizes the motivation through 
setting goals, the degree of overcoming difficulties, and speed of recovery of facing failures 
(Bandura, 1994). The third process is the affective process. Affective elements are the emotional 
master when people adjust their self-efficacy when they face difficulties (Bandura, 1994). The 
people who have low self-efficacy will also have a lower ability to control emotions. However, 
the people who have high self-efficacy will also have a higher ability to adjust emotions when 
they are nervous. The fourth process is the selective process. Self-efficacy influences how people 
select their behaviors, occupations, environments, and interests (Bandura, 1994). If people have 
high self-efficacy, they will have more selections and possibility in lives, such as having more 
interests and higher capabilities.  
In conclusion, the high level of self-efficacy can promote human achievement and well-
being. It also can provide more power to change their behaviors in order to achieve their goals. 
In the political realm, people can increase their political knowledge and political experiences to 
regulate themselves to overcome emotional difficulties while participating in politics.   
 
Political Self-Efficacy 
Political self-efficacy is self-efficacy manifested in the context of political 
communication. Political efficacy is a significant element that can predict democratic 
participation (Morrell, 2003). In the past, many scholars have investigated political efficacy. 
According to Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954), political efficacy was defined as “ the feeling 
that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in 
bringing about this change” (p.187). Arens and Watermann (2017) also defined “political 
efficacy” as referring to individuals believed in their capabilities to actively participate in 
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specific political activities, such as expressing their positive or negative political opinion and 
actively encouraging political candidates who they trust. Chao, Yuan, Li, and Yao (2017) also 
defined political efficacy as individuals’ perception of self-ability to influence politics and their 
cognitions of government or other political systems.  
Unlike these general definitions, further studies demonstrate that political efficacy 
contains two relevant components. These studies combined individuals’ capabilities and their 
attitudes toward governments in two dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy (Balch, 
1974; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009). Internal 
efficacy is the micro level concept. It means someone having both confidence and competence to 
understand and participate in politics effectively (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). Internal efficacy 
also means that individuals think they have the ability to achieve their desired outcomes through 
using their resources to participate in the political process (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & 
Mebane, 2009). Individuals who have greater confidence in their political knowledge, skill, and 
abilities will have high internal political efficacy (Sullivan & Riedel, 2001). External efficacy is 
the macro concept. It refers “to beliefs about the responsiveness of government authorities and 
institutions to citizen demands” (Niemi et al., 1990, p.1407). If individuals have high external 
efficacy, they will think that the government is amenable to executing the wishes of their 
consistency when citizens provide some suggestions.  
Some researchers have compared different functions of Internal and external efficacy. 
Internal efficacy focuses on individuals perceived ability to exert influence, on the other hand, 
external efficacy concerns individuals’ attitudes toward governments whether having ability and 
awareness to exert influence (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009). Additionally, 
Internal efficacy can promote political participation, perceived competence and interest in the 
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political process. (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Kenski, & Jomini, 2004; Pinkleton 
& Austin, 2001; Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; Morrell, 2003). External efficacy can be the 
indicator that citizens trust political system and institution (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). 
Moreover, scholars examined the relationship between political knowledge, political 
information efficacy, and political efficacy. Political knowledge is the extent of one’s 
information that is related to politics in their mind (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In the 
democratic society, citizens should have the political knowledge and political competencies to 
know what happens in the society (Galston, 2001). The citizen who has more abundant political 
knowledge will be more active in political activities and even encourage other people to engage 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Galston, 2001). Education significantly influences the level of 
political knowledge (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Galston, 2001). Additionally, 
interpersonal discussion, media consumption, and income are also important contributors to 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). In Reichert’s 
(2016) research, political knowledge can translate into internal political efficacy. Delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1996) also found that knowledge or information is a significant factor in democratic 
engagement, and it is also the essential element in measuring internal political efficacy. 
Nevertheless, political efficacy only affects people’s intention to participate in conventional 
political acticities, such as voting (Reichert, 2016).  
In light of research on internal efficacy in the political realm, political information 
efficacy is also an important contributor to internal political efficacy. Political information 
efficacy refers to individuals’ degree of confidence about their own political knowledge, which is 
enough or not enough to cause them to participate in politics (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 
2007). It was also defined as one’s feeling that he or she has enough political knowledge to affect 
 19 
politics (Weaver, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011). However, political information efficacy has no 
the scale that has never been tested. Many scholars just use the scale of political efficacy to 
measure political information efficacy (Painter, 2011; Weaver Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 
2011; Tedesco, 2011). Consequently, the scale of political information efficacy needs further 
research in the future. 
In western countries, political information efficacy influences citizens’ civic engagement 
attitudes and voting behaviors, especially among young citizens (Kerlinger, & Lee, 2000; 
McKinney, Spiker, & Kaid, 1998). Young voters show less confidence about their political 
knowledge than older voters, even influencing decision to vote or not vote (Kaid et al, 2004). 
Additionally, men’s political information efficacy is higher than women (Kaid, McKinney, & 
Tedesco, 2007). However, in China, political knowledge tends to affect citizens’ intention to 
participate, information seek, and perception of political efficacy (Zhang & Lin, 2014; Tedesco, 
2011).  
Political efficacy plays a crucial role in media usage and political communication (Zhao 
& Leung, 2013). Mass media is a significant contributor to political socialization in China and 
Taiwan. If people pay more attention to mass media, they will have higher political efficacy than 
people who pay less attention (Wei & Leung, 1998). More importantly, online exposure to 
political information is also correlated to political efficacy.  
 
Political Participation 
Political participation needs to be analyzed in related to the different cultural background. 
In western countries, political participation refers to normal citizens who have intentions and 
actual behaviors that can influence governments’ decisions or policy making directly or 
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indirectly (Bennett & Bennett, 1986). Political participation contains engaging in activities of 
politics, including paying attention, voting for candidates and donating to political campaigns 
(Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). According to Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993), education, income, and age are three crucial predictors of political participation 
from the demographic perspective. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) also developed 
resources of political participation: time, money and civic skills. In their research, institutional 
involvements are also defined as direct participating in political activities. Family background 
and experiences in school can influence intentions and actions of participating in institutional 
involvements (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). In addition, the exposure to positive and 
negative political campaign information significantly influence on political participation (Hyland, 
1995). It also shows functions of mass media in political participation. On the other hand, voting 
and political campaigns influence people's external efficacy in the political realm (Finkel, 1985).  
However, in China, because of the different cultural context and political background, 
political participation has different implications (Xie & Jaeger, 2008). Although China has the 
legal policy allowing citizens can participate in politics, it has limitations and restrictions 
imposed by Party monopolized (Guo, 2007). Lieberthal (2004) suggested that, China has no real 
and meaningful system of political participation like western countries. Before the late 1970s, 
China was under a totalitarian political governance model and the Communist Party had absolute 
power to control the Chinese population (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). Mass media was dominated by 
the state, and freedom of speech, press, and protest. Citizens were engaged in political events not 
to facilitate their personal participation or expression of opinion, but to promote the image of 
government propaganda (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). However, with the development of the reform 
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and opening-up policy, new legislated policy provided more opportunities to Chinese citizens to 
engage in politics.  
However, political participation in China also has some challenges. Citizens do not have 
enough channels and awareness to fully participate in politics (Zhang& Lin, 2014). The central 
authority’s election has not been opened to the general public area, even candidates of local 
elections and voters are restrained by the central government and Chinese Communist Party (Shi, 
1999; Li, 2001). Additionally, the bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government and officials’ 
corrupt behaviors also block citizens’ expression (Shi, 1997). Because officials use their private 
relationship to treat public affairs and provide opportunities for the people who have a close 
relationship deal with officials rather than the normal people who indeed need these 
opportunities. 
In the Chinese political context, formal organizations are contributors to political 
development. Guo (2007) wrote that the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), mass organizations, 
and civic organizations are three typical forms of formal political organizations. Formal 
organizations that have official access attract active citizens, and motivate citizens’ intentions, 
internal efficacy, and external efficacy, which promote their civic skills and even political 
participation (Guo. 2007). Additionally, community activities, grassroots election, and protest 
also were classified in the mode of political participation in China (Chen, Lu, and Yang, 2007; 
Shi, 2008; O’Brien, 1996). Shi (1993) also identified some forms of political participation in 
China in a survey, including expressing opinions to the leader, writing letters to the government 
and newspapers, attaining help from government officials, suing the government in courts etc.  
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Social Media Use, Political Efficacy, and Political Participation 
In this century, the influence of Internet on political participation is obvious. In 
democratic, nondemocratic and transformed society, the Internet is valuable access for citizens to 
communicate with the government to achieve political participation. Internet use and online 
expression have a direct relationship. The Internet provides a convenient, cheap and anonymous 
access to users to express their opinions, which brings a safe and comfortable feeling to users 
(Medaglia & Zhu, 2017).  
According to Muir and Oppenheim (2002), political participation on the Internet occurs 
because people are " more informed about government laws, regulations, policies, and services” 
with online information (p.175). Internet use and consumption of online political information 
have a significantly positive relationship with political actions (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; 
Mossberger & McNeal, 2008). Information seeking is the essential reason to use the Internet 
(Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). According to Lee (2006), Internet access is an easy way to 
communicate with government and engage in political activity, which is part of political 
participation. In Tedesco’s (2011) research, Internet exposure to politics and interactivity on the 
Web not only promotes individual’s political efficacy, but also increases political participation, 
such as voting and online expression (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009). 
Besides, online social networking sites can facilitate civic and political participation (de 
Zúñiga, Puig-i-Abril, & Rojas, 2009). For instance, Facebook played a significant role during the 
2008 presidential election in the USA. On Facebook, citizens communicated their political 
attitudes and information, advocated candidates, and participated in online discussions (Vitak et 
al., 2011).   
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With the development of social media in China, political participation has new 
implications. According to Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng (2014), using social media 
news frequently has an obvious influence on political expression and offline political 
participation. Although in the Chinese context there is the same amount of free space with 
western countries, social media also brings more opportunities to Chinese citizens to express and 
participate in politics (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Zhang and Lin’s (2014) research shows that political 
activates on social networking sites are positively associated with political participation. Weibo 
is one of the important platforms that engage citizens common and discuss politics in China. The 
intensity of use of Weibo will increase users’ intentions to express opinions about politics and 
government (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). Weibo provides a stage that can allow access to 
information about politics to users, which give them confidence in understanding current 
political affairs and participating in political discussions (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). 
According to Chen (2017), the frequency of WeChat usage is the predictor of political 
participation. For example, people can repost report of news or political information, and they 
can also share the information with individuals or groups (Bimber, 2001). Elaborate on the 
relationship between social media use and political behavior – social media has become a 
dominant communication channel for acquiring, dissemination, responding to information about 
politics.  
In addition, the mediating functions of political efficacy between media use and political 
participation have been examined. Reichert (2016) had examined the mediating role of internal 
political efficacy between political knowledge and political participation. Some previous 
researches showed that political knowledge can increase voting behaviors…. but other 
researchers found that political knowledge had less influence on other types of political 
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participation (Delli Carpini ＆ Keeter, 1996; Howe, 2006; Milner, 2007; Oesterreich, 2003). In 
the Reichert’s (2016) research, political knowledge did not have a significant influence on 
political participation. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate political efficacy as mediating 
variable influencing political behaviors. Reichert’s research shows that internal political efficacy 
has no relationship with voting but internal efficacy plays a mediating role, which cause political 
knowledge to influence political participation. It is undeniable that political knowledge is 
positively related to media use, especially social media use (Kenski & Stroud, 2006); Gil de 
Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). Consequently, internal political efficacy also can be a 
mediator between social media use and political participation. Additionally, Reichert also 
examined the intentions of political participation. Intentions are prerequisites of actual behaviors 
(Ajzen, 2012). Intentions combined with personal interests, political attitudes, and faiths etc 
(Galston, 2001; Polonsky et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Under Chinese political background, based on uses and gratification theory and social 
cognitive theory, it is important to research whether social media use promotes political 
participation or intentions of political participation. There are no specific researchers who focus 
on examining the sole mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political 
participation in China. Therefore, political efficacy as a mediating variable between social media 
use and political participation should be investigated in the Chinese political background. 
Especially, in the one party political context, the Chinese Communist Party has absolute 
authority in all social realms (Zhang & Lin, 2014). The methods of actual political participation 
are limited. Consequently, researching attitude toward and the behavior of political participation 
among Chinese citizens is feasible. Moreover, researching the intentions of political participation 
also can explore Chinese citizens’ thoughts about actual political participation, and detect their 
aspiration to political participation.  
 
Research Questions  
R1: What's the relationship between using social media and political efficacy in China? 
R2: What's the relationship between internal political efficacy and political participation 
in China? 
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R3: What's the relationship between external political efficacy and political participation 
in China? 
The capital letters represent following phrases.  
SMU: social media use 
IPE: internal political efficacy 
EPE: external political efficacy 
PP: political participation 
 
Hypotheses  
The first set of hypotheses deals with the relationship between social media use and 
political efficacy (SMU, IPE, EPE): 
H1: There is a positive relationship between social media use (SMU) and internal political 
efficacy (IPE). (SMUà IPE) 
H2: There is a positive relationship between social media (SMU) use and external 
political efficacy (EPE). (SMUà EPE) 
The second set of hypotheses has to do with the relationship between political efficacy and 
political participation (IPE, EPE, and PP): 
H3: There is a positive relationship between internal political efficacy (IPE) and political 
participation (PP). (IPEàPP)  
H4: There is a positive relationship between external political efficacy (EPE) and political 
participation (PP). (EPEàPP) 
The third set of hypotheses tests the mediating role of political efficacy: 
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H5: Internal political efficacy (IPE) will mediate the relationship between social media 
use (SMU) and political participation (PP). (SMUà IPEà PP) 
H6: External political efficacy (EPE) will mediate the relationship between social media 
use (SMU) and political participation (PP). (SMUà EPEà PP) 
 
Figure 2. The structural equation model that incorporates all above-stated hypotheses 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Design & Sample 
An online survey was conducted among Chinese adults during October 2017. AskForm 
(www.askform.cn), an online survey platform in China will be used for data collection. 
Established in 2001, AskForm serves multinational clients like Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, 
China Unicom and American Marketing Association. The researcher invited participants through 
popular Chinese social media sites such as Wechat, Sina Weibo, QQ, and Facebook, and 
members of well-known online communities like bbs.tianya.in, qzone.qq.com, and renren.com. 
Additionally, except social media platforms, the researcher also recruited Chinese professors, 
administrators of universities, students, managers of business, and employees of different realms 
to disseminate questionnaires. The total sample size is 1159. The table 1, table 2, table 3, and 
table 4 display demographic information of the sample. 
Table 1. Sample Gender. 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male 616 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Female 543 46.9 46.9 100 
Total 1159 100 100   
 
Table 2. Sample Age.  
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
18-25 404 34.9 34.9 34.9 
26-30 187 16.1 16.1 51.0 
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Table 3. Sample Province. 
Province Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Shanghai 24 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Yunnan 7 0.6 0.6 2.7 
Inner Mongolia 9 0.8 0.8 3.5 
Beijing 64 5.5 5.5 9.0 
Jilin 18 1.6 1.6 10.5 
Sichuan 6 0.5 0.5 11.0 
Tianjin 8 0.7 0.7 11.7 
Anhui 9 0.8 0.8 12.5 
Shandong 22 1.9 1.9 14.4 
Shanxi 6 0.5 0.5 14.9 
Guangdong 55 4.7 4.7 19.7 
Guangxi 5 0.4 0.4 20.1 
Xinjiang 7 0.6 0.6 20.7 
Jiangsu 15 1.3 1.3 22.0 
Jiangxi 2 0.2 0.2 22.2 
Hebei 18 1.6 1.6 23.7 
Henan 8 0.7 0.7 24.4 
Zhejiang 15 1.3 1.3 25.7 
Hainan 2 0.2 0.2 25.9 
Overseas 18 1.6 1.6 27.4 
Hubei 5 0.4 0.4 27.9 
Hunan 9 0.8 0.8 28.6 
Gansu 9 0.8 0.8 29.4 
Fujian 15 1.3 1.3 30.7 
Guizhou 11 0.9 0.9 31.7 
Liaoning 643 55.5 55.5 87.1 
Chongqing 8 0.7 0.7 87.8 
Shanxi 8 0.7 0.7 88.5 
Qinghai 1 0.1 0.1 88.6 
Heilongjiang 132 11.4 11.4 100.0 
Total 1159 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
31-35 86 7.4 7.4 58.4 
36-40 52 4.5 4.5 62.9 
41-45 63 5.4 5.4 68.3 
46-50 77 6.6 6.6 75.0 
51-55 119 10.3 10.3 85.2 
56-60 127 11.0 11.0 96.2 
60+ 44 3.8 3.8 100.0 
Total 1159 100.0 100.0  
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Table 4. Sample Education Level. 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Doctoral 
Master’s 
Bachelor’s 
College 
High School 
Total 
25 2.2 2.2 2.2 
183 15.8 15.8 90.7 
695 60.0 60.0 74.9 
148 12.8 12.8 14.9 
108 9.3 9.3 100.0 
1159 100.0 100.0  
 
Survey Instrument  
The survey questionnaire will be designed in English first and then translated to Chinese. 
Instructions will be presented before the questions, including the informed consent. The 
questionnaire contains approximately thirty questions, and takes about five to ten minutes to 
complete. Measures of the key variables are adopted from previously published studies. All 
measures have shown acceptable reliability and validity.   
Social media use about politics 
The ten-item measure Zhang and Lin (2014) used in their study of political information 
exchange via social media and SNS-based political activities in China will be adopted in the 
present study. The items will be presented on a five-point frequency scale: never, rarely, 
sometimes, often, and always.  
(1) I read hard news via social media. 
(2) I repost photos or videos clips on government or politics. 
(3) I upload photos or videos shot by myself on non-recreational latest events.  
(4) I vote online.  
(5) I write blogs on government or politics, such as politics, economics, or   international 
relations. 
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(6) I join topic discussions of politics via social media. 
(7) I post political issues on social media and seek help or discussion.  
(8) I express opinions explicitly on government and politics via social media.  
(9) I follow and interacted with official Social media accounts of governmental or 
political institutions. 
(10) I organize non-governmental campaigns or activities via social media. 
Internal political efficacy 
To measure internal political efficacy, this study will use seven Likert-scale (strongly 
agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree) items adopted from Niemi, Craig, and 
Mattei (1991) and Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg (2004). 
(1) I know more about politics than most people my age. 
(2) When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to 
say. 
(3) I am able to understand most political issues easily.  
(4) I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.  
(5) I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing 
our country.  
(6) I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
(7) I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people 
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External political efficacy 
Five Likert-scaled (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree) items 
will be used to measure external political efficacy. These items are also adopted from Niemi, 
Craig, and Mattei (1991) and Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg (2004).  
(1) I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think. 
(2) The government cares a lot about what all of us think about new laws. 
(3) The government is doing its best to find out what people want. 
(4) The powerful leaders in government care very little about the opinions of people.  
(5) When people get together to demand change, the leaders in government listen. 
Political participation 
Zhang and Lin (2014) drew the distinction among three modes of political participation 
in China: canonical, contacting/lobbying and CCP (Chinese Communist Party)-initiated. Their 
results indicated that, perhaps due to the authoritarian and conservative political system in China, 
participation in the contacting/lobbying and CCP-initiated modes were substantially lower than 
participation in the canonical mode. This study will therefore focus on the canonical mode of 
political participation measured by four items on 5-point frequency scale (never, rarely, 
sometimes, often, or always).    
(1) I discuss politics with friends or colleagues. 
(2) I sign petition letters. 
(3) I join demonstrations that are not organized by party officials.  
(4) I contact official media to cover the event. 
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Chapter Five 
Results 
 
Table 5 presents the means and standards deviations of the items used to measure SMU, 
IPE, EPE, and PP. It also shows the means and standard deviations of the averaged composite 
measures of these constructs as well as the Cronbach’s alphas used to measure the internal 
consistency of the scales. All Cronbach’s alphas were greater than 0.70, indicating the measures 
achieved acceptable levels of internal consistency. 
Table 5. Descriptive and Reliability Statistics. 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Cronbach’s α 
SMU 
smu1 
1158 
1158 
1.9511 
3.3420 
.71675 
1.07239 
.914 
sum2 1158 2.0769 1.04611  
smu3 1158 1.8756 .97243  
smu4 1158 2.3903 .96327  
smu5 1158 1.5535 .92976  
smu6 1158 1.7858 .93657  
smu7 1158 1.6114 .87069  
smu8 1158 1.6952 .93773  
smu9 1158 1.7090 .94486  
smu10 1158 1.4715 .86042  
IPE 1158 2.9768 .72357 .900 
ipe1 1158 3.0242 .89526  
ipe2 1158 2.8264 .93898  
ipe3 1158 3.1623 .89919  
ipe4 1158 2.8998 .90727  
ipe5 1158 3.2029 .93307  
ipe6 1158 2.7772 .87731  
ipe7 1158 2.9447 .95647  
EPE 1158 3.1838 .61337 .704 
epe1 1158 2.9905 .92450  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Cronbach’s α 
epe2 1158 3.2591 .88894  
epe3 1158 3.3316 .92533  
epe4 1158 3.2159 .95356  
epe5 1158 3.1218 .83352  
PP 1158 1.7651 .66732 .785 
pp1 1158 2.6105 .89237  
pp2 1158 1.6339 .89691  
pp3 1158 1.3636 .79537  
pp4 1158 1.4525 .83510  
Valid N (listwise) 1158    
 
Measurement Model Results 
Table 6 shows the standardized regression weights of the constructs and their indicators. 
All regression weights are statistically significant (P<.001), indicating acceptable validity of the 
measurement model.  
Table 6. Measurement Model Results. 
   Standardized regression weight p 
smu10 ß SMU .767 -- 
smu9 ß SMU .756 *** 
smu8 ß SMU .821 *** 
smu7 ß SMU .859 *** 
smu6 ß SMU .873 *** 
smu5 ß SMU .828 *** 
smu4 ß SMU .603 *** 
smu3 ß SMU .675 *** 
smu2 ß SMU .698 *** 
smu1 ß SMU .366 *** 
ipe1 ß IPE .757 -- 
ipe2 ß IPE .776 *** 
ipe3 ß IPE .791 *** 
ipe4 ß IPE .758 *** 
ipe5 ß IPE .736 *** 
ipe6 ß IPE .779 *** 
ipe7 ß IPE .649 *** 
epe5 ß EPE .605 -- 
epe4 ß EPE .291 *** 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
   Standardized regression weight p 
epe3 ß EPE .886 *** 
epe2 ß EPE .798 *** 
epe1 ß EPE .223 *** 
pp1 ß PP .417 -- 
pp2 ß PP .745 *** 
pp3 ß PP .853 *** 
pp4 ß PP .820 *** 
*** p<0.001, X! = 2993.34, df = 295, p = .000; 
GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI = .927; CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059 
 
Structure Model Results 
  Table 7 presents the results of the structural model obtained through SPSS AMOS 
(version 24.0). An initial question is whether the structural equation analysis estimates for the 
model provide adequate fit to the data. Although the Chi-square test indicates a lack of model fit 
(X2 = 2993.34, df = 295, p = .000), it should be noted that the Chi-square test is sensitive to large 
sample sizes, like the one employed in the present study. Assessment of the model’s fit thus 
relied on other goodness-of-fit indices. Bryne (2001) suggests that models with GFI, AGFI, and 
CFI values greater than .90, and a RMSEA less than or equal to .10 be judged as providing a 
reasonable fit to the data. Similarly, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend RMSEA values 
below .06. In this study, all these goodness-of-fit measures (GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI 
= .927; CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059) indicate that the model provides acceptable fit 
to the data. Figure 2 is a pictorial display of the structural model results. 
 
Table 7. Estimated Standardized Regression Weights 
   Standardized regression weight p 
SMU à IPE .516 *** 
SMU à EPE .177 *** 
IPE à PP .401 *** 
EPE à PP .044 .172 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
*** p < .001 
Chi-square = 2993.34, df = 295, p = .000; GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI = .927;  
CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059 
 
 
Figure 3. Structural Equation Model Results (*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.01) 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
In this section, hypotheses testing results are presented. H1 states that there is a positive 
relationship between social media use (SMU) and internal political efficacy (IPE). The 
hypothesis was supported by the significant and positive regression coefficient from SMU to IPE 
(β SMUàIPE = 0.516, p < 0.001).  
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H2 predicts that there is a positive relationship between social media use (SMU) and 
external political efficacy (EPE). Supporting the hypothesis, results of the SEM analysis showed 
that the relationship was significant and positive (β SMUàEPE = 0.18, p < 0.001). Together, the 
results showed that the relationship between SMU and IPE is stronger than that between SMU 
and EPE.     
H3 states that there is a positive relationship between internal political efficacy (IPE) and 
political participation (PP). Supporting the hypothesis, SEM results showed that the relationship 
was significant and positive (β IPEàPP = .401, p < 0.001). The results, however, failed to 
support H4 which predicted a positive relationship between external political efficacy (EPE) and 
political participation (PP) (β EPEàPP = .044, p = .172).  
H5, which posits that internal political efficacy is the mediator between social media use 
and political participation (SMUà IPEà PP), was supported (β SMUàIPE = 0.516, p < 0.001; 
β IPEàPP = .401, p < 0.001). H6 predicts that external political efficacy plays a mediating role 
between social media use and political participation (SMUà EPEà PP). Results showed that, 
despite the significant path between SMU and EPE (β SMUàEPE = 0.18, p < 0.001), the path 
between EPE and PP did not attain statistical significance (β EPEàPP = .044, p = .172). Thus 
H6 was not supported.  
 
Additional Findings 
In this section, this study presents some additional analysis pertaining to sample 
demographics.  
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Gender 
Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations of SMU for male and female 
respondents. Results of a one-way analysis of variance (Table 9) showed that male respondents’ 
SMU use (mean = 2.035) was significantly higher than that of female respondents (mean = 1.855) 
(F = 18.499, p = .000). Analysis (Table 10 & 11) showed that male respondents (mean = 3.073) 
exhibited higher level of IPE than female respondents (mean = 2.867) (F = 23.863, p = .000). 
Conversely, as shown in Table 12 & 13, female respondents (mean = 3.221) exhibited higher 
EPE than male respondents (mean = 3.150) (F =3.927, p= .048). Finally, Table 14 & 15 show 
that male respondents showed higher level of PP (mean = 1.8435) than female respondents 
(mean = 1.6763), and the difference was statistically significant (F = 18.367, p = .000).   
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable: SMU 
 
Table 9. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
 
 
 
Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
Male 2.0356 .76460 615 
Female 1.8554 .64585 543 
Total 1.9511 .71675 1158 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 9.362a 1 9.362 18.499 .000 .016 
Intercept 4366.147 1 4366.147 8627.338 .000 .882 
Gender 9.362 1 9.362 18.499 .000 .016 
Error 585.032 1156 .506    
Total 5002.760 1158     
Corrected Total 594.394 1157     
a. R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = .015) 
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
Male 3.0734 .76297 615 
Female 2.8674 .65999 543 
Total 2.9768 .72357 1158 
 
Table 11. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
12.238a 1 12.238 23.836 .000 .020 
Intercept 10177.876 1 10177.876 19823.911 .000 .945 
Gender 12.238 1 12.238 23.836 .000 .020 
Error 593.507 1156 .513    
Total 10867.224 1158     
Corrected Total 605.744 1157     
a. R Squared = .020 (Adjusted R Squared = .019) 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
Male 3.1502 .64918 615 
Female 3.2217 .56833 543 
Total 3.1838 .61337 1158 
 
Table 13. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
1.474a 1 1.474 3.927 .048 .003 
Intercept 11708.857 1 11708.857 31200.514 .000 .964 
Gender 1.474 1 1.474 3.927 .048 .003 
Error 433.821 1156 .375    
Total 12173.200 1158     
Corrected Total 435.295 1157     
a. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = .003) 
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Table 14. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
Male 1.8435 .71198 615 
Female 1.6763 .60124 543 
Total 1.7651 .66732 1158 
 
Table 15. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
8.058a 1 8.058 18.367 .000 .016 
Intercept 3572.811 1 3572.811 8143.442 .000 .876 
Gender 8.058 1 8.058 18.367 .000 .016 
Error 507.177 1156 .439    
Total 4123.125 1158     
Corrected Total 515.236 1157     
a. R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = .015) 
 
Age 
Table 16 to 27 present values of SMU, IPE, EPE, and PP across age groups as well as 
tests of differences via ANOVA and post-hoc comparisons with Tukey’s HSD procedure. For 
SMU, the only significant difference was found between age 31-35 (mean = 2.141) and age 56-
60 (mean = 1.828) groups. For IPE, the general finding was that older respondents exhibited 
higher level of IPE than younger respondents. Likewise, older respondents showed higher level 
of EPE than younger respondents. However, no statistically significant difference in PP was 
observed across the age groups.  
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
18-25 1.9973 .75126 404 
26-30 1.9333 .71165 186 
31-35 2.1407 .77799 86 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
36-40 1.9192 .50412 52 
41-45 1.9683 .72575 63 
46-50 1.8091 .49423 77 
51-55 1.9664 .73638 119 
56-60 1.8276 .70595 127 
60+ 1.8091 .72105 44 
Total 1.9511 .71675 1158 
 
Table 17. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 8.489a 8 1.061 2.081 .035 .014 
Intercept 2831.330 1 2831.330 5552.440 .000 .829 
Age 8.489 8 1.061 2.081 .035 .014 
Error 585.904 1149 .510    
Total 5002.760 1158     
Corrected Total 594.394 1157     
a. R Squared = .014 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
 
Table 18. Multiple Comparisons. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
Tukey HSD   
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 26-30 0.0639 0.06328 0.985 -0.1327 0.2606 
 31-35 -0.1434 0.0848 0.752 -0.407 0.1201 
 36-40 0.0780 0.10521 0.998 -0.2489 0.405 
18-25 41-45 0.0290 0.09673 1.000 -0.2716 0.3296 
 46-50 0.1882 0.0888 0.460 -0.0878 0.4641 
 51-55 0.0309 0.07448 1.000 -0.2006 0.2624 
 56-60 0.1697 0.07265 0.321 -0.056 0.3955 
 60+ 0.1882 0.11336 0.771 -0.1641 0.5405 
 18-25 -0.0639 0.06328 0.985 -0.2606 0.1327 
 31-35 -0.2074 0.09312 0.389 -0.4967 0.082 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 36-40 0.0141 0.11202 1.000 -0.3340 0.3622 
26-30 41-45 -0.0349 0.10409 1.000 -0.3584 0.2886 
 46-50 0.1242 0.09677 0.936 -0.1765 0.4250 
 51-55 -0.0331 0.08382 1.000 -0.2936 0.2274 
 56-60 0.1058 0.0822 0.935 -0.1497 0.3612 
 60+ 0.1242 0.11971 0.982 -0.2478 0.4963 
 18-25 0.1434 0.0848 0.752 -0.1201 0.4070 
 26-30 0.2074 0.09312 0.389 -0.082 0.4967 
 36-40 0.2215 0.12544 0.705 -0.1684 0.6113 
31-35 41-45 0.1724 0.11842 0.875 -0.1956 0.5405 
 46-50 0.3316 0.11203 0.076 -0.0166 0.6798 
 51-55 0.1743 0.10107 0.731 -0.1398 0.4884 
 56-60 .3131
* 0.09972 0.045 0.0032 0.6230 
 60+ 0.3316 0.13236 0.230 -0.0797 0.7429 
 18-25 -0.078 0.10521 0.998 -0.4050 0.2489 
 26-30 -0.0141 0.11202 1.000 -0.3622 0.3340 
 31-35 -0.2215 0.12544 0.705 -0.6113 0.1684 
 41-45 -0.0490 0.13379 1.000 -0.4648 0.3668 
36-40 46-50 0.1101 0.12817 0.995 -0.2882 0.5085 
 51-55 -0.0472 0.11871 1.000 -0.4161 0.3217 
 56-60 0.0917 0.11756 0.997 -0.2737 0.4570 
 60+ 0.1101 0.14627 0.998 -0.3444 0.5647 
 18-25 -0.029 0.09673 1.000 -0.3296 0.2716 
 26-30 0.0349 0.10409 1.000 -0.2886 0.3584 
 31-35 -0.1724 0.11842 0.875 -0.5405 0.1956 
41-45 36-40 0.049 0.13379 1.000 -0.3668 0.4648 
 46-50 0.1592 0.12131 0.928 -0.2178 0.5362 
 51-55 0.0019 0.11126 1.000 -0.3439 0.3476 
 56-60 0.1407 0.11004 0.938 -0.2013 0.4827 
 60+ 0.1592 0.14030 0.969 -0.2768 0.5952 
 18-25 -0.1882 0.08880 0.460 -0.4641 0.0878 
 26-30 -0.1242 0.09677 0.936 -0.425 0.1765 
 31-35 -0.3316 0.11203 0.076 -0.6798 0.0166 
46-50 36-40 -0.1101 0.12817 0.995 -0.5085 0.2882 
 41-45 -0.1592 0.12131 0.928 -0.5362 0.2178 
 51-55 -0.1573 0.10444 0.853 -0.4819 0.1673 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
46-50 56-60 -0.0185 0.10314 1.000 -0.339 0.3021 
 60+ 0.0000 0.13495 1.000 -0.4194 0.4194 
 18-25 -0.0309 0.07448 1.000 -0.2624 0.2006 
 26-30 0.0331 0.08382 1.000 -0.2274 0.2936 
 31-35 -0.1743 0.10107 0.731 -0.4884 0.1398 
51-55 36-40 0.0472 0.11871 1.000 -0.3217 0.4161 
 41-45 -0.0019 0.11126 1.000 -0.3476 0.3439 
 46-50 0.1573 0.10444 0.853 -0.1673 0.4819 
 56-60 0.1388 0.09111 0.844 -0.1443 0.4220 
 60+ 0.1573 0.12599 0.945 -0.2343 0.5488 
 18-25 -0.1697 0.07265 0.321 -0.3955 0.0560 
 26-30 -0.1058 0.08220 0.935 -0.3612 0.1497 
 31-35 -.3131
* 0.09972 0.045 -0.6230 -0.0032 
56-60 36-40 -0.0917 0.11756 0.997 -0.4570 0.2737 
 41-45 -0.1407 0.11004 0.938 -0.4827 0.2013 
 46-50 0.0185 0.10314 1.000 -0.3021 0.3390 
 51-55 -0.1388 0.09111 0.844 -0.4220 0.1443 
 60+ 0.0185 0.12492 1.000 -0.3697 0.4067 
 18-25 -0.1882 0.11336 0.771 -0.5405 0.1641 
 26-30 -0.1242 0.11971 0.982 -0.4963 0.2478 
 31-35 -0.3316 0.13236 0.230 -0.7429 0.0797 
60+ 36-40 -0.1101 0.14627 0.998 -0.5647 0.3444 
 41-45 -0.1592 0.14030 0.969 -0.5952 0.2768 
 46-50 0.0000 0.13495 1.000 -0.4194 0.4194 
 51-55 -0.1573 0.12599 0.945 -0.5488 0.2343 
 56-60 -0.0185 0.12492 1.000 -0.4067 0.3697 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .510. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
18-25 2.8129 0.72314 404 
26-30 2.8425 0.73289 186 
31-35 3.0598 0.82298 86 
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Table 19 (Continued) 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
36-40 3.0357 0.63754 52 
41-45 3.0499 0.66915 63 
46-50 3.115 0.67008 77 
51-55 3.2269 0.61555 119 
56-60 3.1777 0.70164 127 
60+ 3.2143 0.62650 44 
Total 2.9768 0.72357 1158 
 
Table 20. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 31.832a 8 3.979 7.966 .000 .053 
Intercept 7113.929 1 7113.929 14242.421 .000 .925 
Age 31.832 8 3.979 7.966 .000 .053 
Error 573.913 1149 .499    
Total 10867.224 1158     
Corrected Total 605.744 1157     
a. R Squared = .053 (Adjusted R Squared = .046) 
  
Table 21. Multiple Comparisons. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Tukey HSD   
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 26-30 -0.0296 0.06262 1.000 -0.2242 0.1650 
  31-35 -0.2469 0.08393 0.080 -0.5077 0.0140 
  36-40 -0.2228 0.10412 0.447 -0.5464 0.1008 
18-25 41-45 -0.2369 0.09573 0.245 -0.5345 0.0606 
 46-50 -.3021* 0.08788 0.018 -0.5752 -0.0290 
 51-55 -.4139* 0.07371 0.000 -0.6430 -0.1849 
 56-60 -.3648* 0.07190 0.000 -0.5882 -0.1413 
 60+ -.4013* 0.11220 0.011 -0.7500 -0.0527 
26-30 18-25 0.0296 0.06262 1.000 -0.1650 0.2242 
 31-35 -0.2173 0.09216 0.309 -0.5037 0.0692 
 36-40 -0.1932 0.11086 0.720 -0.5377 0.1514 
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Table 21 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 41-45 -0.2073 0.10302 0.535 -0.5275 0.1128 
26-30 46-50 -0.2725 0.09577 0.104 -0.5701 0.0252 
 51-55 -.3843
* 0.08296 0.000 -0.6422 -0.1265 
 56-60 -.3352
* 0.08135 0.001 -0.5880 -0.0824 
 60+ -.3717
* 0.11848 0.046 -0.7399 -0.0035 
 18-25 0.2469 0.08393 0.080 -0.0140 0.5077 
 26-30 0.2173 0.09216 0.309 -0.0692 0.5037 
 36-40 0.0241 0.12415 
1.000 -0.3617 0.4099 
31-35 41-45 0.0099 0.1172 1.000 -0.3543 0.3741 
 46-50 -0.0552 0.11088 
1.000 -0.3998 0.2894 
 51-55 -0.1671 0.10003 0.765 -0.4779 0.1438 
 56-60 -0.1179 0.09870 0.958 -0.4246 0.1888 
 60+ -0.1545 0.1310 0.961 -0.5616 0.2526 
 18-25 0.2228 0.10412 0.447 -0.1008 0.5464 
 26-30 0.1932 0.11086 0.720 -0.1514 0.5377 
 31-35 -0.0241 0.12415 
1.000 -0.4099 0.3617 
36-40 41-45 -0.0142 0.13242 1.000 -0.4257 0.3973 
 46-50 -0.0793 0.12686 0.999 -0.4735 0.3149 
 51-55 -0.1912 0.11749 0.790 -0.5563 0.1739 
 56-60 -0.1420 0.11636 0.952 -0.5036 0.2196 
 60+ -0.1786 0.14477 0.949 -0.6285 0.2713 
 18-25 0.2369 0.09573 0.245 -0.0606 0.5345 
 26-30 0.2073 0.10302 0.535 -0.1128 0.5275 
 31-35 -0.0099 0.11720 1.000 -0.3741 0.3543 
41-45 36-40 0.0142 0.13242 1.000 -0.3973 0.4257 
 46-50 -0.0651 0.12006 1.000 -0.4383 0.3080 
 51-55 -0.1770 0.11012 0.801 -0.5192 0.1652 
 56-60 -0.1278 0.10891 0.962 -0.4663 0.2106 
 60+ -0.1644 0.13885 0.960 -0.5959 0.2671 
 18-25 .3021* 0.08788 0.018 0.029 0.5752 
 26-30 0.2725 0.09577 0.104 -0.0252 0.5701 
 31-35 0.0552 0.11088 1.000 -0.2894 0.3998 
46-50 36-40 0.0793 0.12686 0.999 -0.3149 0.4735 
 41-45 0.0651 0.12006 1.000 -0.308 0.4383 
 51-55 -0.1119 0.10336 0.977 -0.4331 0.2094 
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Table 21 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
46-50 56-60 -0.0627 0.10208 1.000 -0.3799 0.2545 
 60+ -0.0993 0.13356 0.998 -0.5143 0.3158 
 18-25 .4139
* 0.07371 0.000 0.1849 0.6430 
 26-30 .3843
* 0.08296 0.000 0.1265 0.6422 
 31-35 0.1671 0.10003 0.765 -0.1438 0.4779 
51-55 36-40 0.1912 0.11749 0.790 -0.1739 0.5563 
 41-45 0.1770 0.11012 0.801 -0.1652 0.5192 
 46-50 0.1119 0.10336 0.977 -0.2094 0.4331 
 56-60 0.0492 0.09017 1.000 -0.2311 0.3294 
 60+ 0.0126 0.1247 1.000 -0.3749 0.4001 
 18-25 .3648
* 0.07190 0.000 0.1413 0.5882 
 26-30 .3352
* 0.08135 0.001 0.0824 0.5880 
 31-35 0.1179 0.09870 0.958 -0.1888 0.4246 
56-60 36-40 0.1420 0.11636 0.952 -0.2196 0.5036 
 41-45 0.1278 0.10891 0.962 -0.2106 0.4663 
 46-50 0.0627 0.10208 1.000 -0.2545 0.3799 
 51-55 -0.0492 0.09017 1.000 -0.3294 0.2311 
 60+ -0.0366 0.12363 1.000 -0.4208 0.3477 
 18-25 .4013
* 0.11220 0.011 0.0527 0.7500 
 26-30 .3717
* 0.11848 0.046 0.0035 0.7399 
 31-35 0.1545 0.1310 0.961 -0.2526 0.5616 
60+ 36-40 0.1786 0.14477 0.949 -0.2713 0.6285 
 41-45 0.1644 0.13885 0.960 -0.2671 0.5959 
 46-50 0.0993 0.13356 0.998 -0.3158 0.5143 
 51-55 -0.0126 0.12470 1.000 -0.4001 0.3749 
 56-60 0.0366 0.12363 1.000 -0.3477 0.4208 
Based on observed means.  
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .499. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Table 22. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
18-25 3.1634 .62776 404 
26-30 3.0527 .61055 186 
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Table 23. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Table 24. Multiple Comparisons. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Tukey HSD   
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  26-30 0.111 0.054 0.504 -0.057 0.278 
 31-35 0.091 0.072 0.941 -0.133 0.316 
18-25 36-40 0.013 0.090 1.000 -0.265 0.292 
 41-45 -0.014 0.082 1.000 -0.270 0.241 
 46-50 -0.130 0.076 0.733 -0.365 0.105 
Table 22 (Continued) 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
31-35 3.0721 .65145 86 
36-40 3.1500 .68356 52 
41-45 3.1778 .69571 63 
46-50 3.2935 .52374 77 
51-55 3.3025 .55226 119 
56-60 3.2598 .55738 127 
60+ 3.4591 .49289 44 
Total 3.1838 .61337 1158 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 11.174a 8 1.397 3.784 .000 .026 
Intercept 7853.592 1 7853.592 21276.425 .000 .949 
Age 11.174 8 1.397 3.784 .000 .026 
Error 424.121 1149 .369    
Total 12173.200 1158     
Corrected Total 435.295 1157     
a. R Squared = .026 (Adjusted R Squared = .019) 
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Table 24 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
18-25 51-55 -0.139 0.063 0.409 -0.336 0.058 
 56-60 -0.097 0.062 0.826 -0.289 0.096 
 60+ -0.296 0.096 0.056 -0.596 0.004 
 18-25 -0.111 0.054 0.504 -0.278 0.057 
 31-35 -0.019 0.079 1.000 -0.266 0.227 
 36-40 -0.097 0.095 0.984 -0.394 0.199 
 41-45 -0.125 0.089 0.893 -0.400 0.150 
26-30 46-50 -0.241 0.082 0.084 -0.497 0.015 
 51-55 -.2498
* 0.071 0.014 -0.472 -0.028 
 56-60 -0.207 0.070 0.076 -0.425 0.010 
 60+ -.4064
* 0.102 0.002 -0.723 -0.090 
 18-25 -0.091 0.072 0.941 -0.316 0.133 
 26-30 0.019 0.079 1.000 -0.227 0.266 
 36-40 -0.078 0.107 0.998 -0.410 0.254 
31-35 41-45 -0.106 0.101 0.981 -0.419 0.207 
 46-50 -0.221 0.095 0.329 -0.518 0.075 
 51-55 -0.230 0.086 0.156 -0.498 0.037 
 56-60 -0.188 0.085 0.398 -0.451 0.076 
 60+ -.3870
* 0.113 0.018 -0.737 -0.037 
 18-25 -0.013 0.090 1.000 -0.292 0.265 
 26-30 0.097 0.095 0.984 -0.199 0.394 
 31-35 0.078 0.107 0.998 -0.254 0.410 
36-40 41-45 -0.028 0.114 1.000 -0.382 0.326 
 46-50 -0.144 0.109 0.927 -0.482 0.195 
 51-55 -0.153 0.101 0.851 -0.466 0.161 
 56-60 -0.110 0.100 0.975 -0.421 0.201 
 60+ -0.309 0.124 0.241 -0.696 0.078 
 18-25 0.014 0.082 1.000 -0.241 0.270 
 26-30 0.125 0.089 0.893 -0.150 0.400 
 31-35 0.106 0.101 0.981 -0.207 0.419 
41-45 36-40 0.028 0.114 1.000 -0.326 0.382 
 46-50 -0.116 0.103 0.971 -0.437 0.205 
 51-55 -0.125 0.095 0.926 -0.419 0.169 
 56-60 -0.082 0.094 0.994 -0.373 0.209 
 60+ -0.281 0.119 0.309 -0.652 0.090 
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Table 24 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 18-25 0.130 0.076 0.733 -0.105 0.365 
 26-30 0.241 0.082 0.084 -0.015 0.497 
 31-35 0.221 0.095 0.329 -0.075 0.518 
46-50 36-40 0.144 0.109 0.927 -0.195 0.482 
 41-45 0.116 0.103 0.971 -0.205 0.437 
 51-55 -0.009 0.089 1.000 -0.285 0.267 
 56-60 0.034 0.088 1.000 -0.239 0.306 
 60+ -0.166 0.115 0.881 -0.522 0.191 
 18-25 0.139 0.063 0.409 -0.058 0.336 
 26-30 .2498
* 0.071 0.014 0.028 0.472 
 31-35 0.230 0.086 0.156 -0.037 0.498 
51-55 36-40 0.153 0.101 0.851 -0.161 0.466 
 41-45 0.125 0.095 0.926 -0.169 0.419 
 46-50 0.009 0.089 1.000 -0.267 0.285 
 56-60 0.043 0.078 1.000 -0.198 0.284 
 60+ -0.157 0.107 0.873 -0.490 0.177 
 18-25 0.097 0.062 0.826 -0.096 0.289 
 26-30 0.207 0.070 0.076 -0.010 0.425 
 31-35 0.188 0.085 0.398 -0.076 0.451 
56-60 36-40 0.110 0.100 0.975 -0.201 0.421 
 41-45 0.082 0.094 0.994 -0.209 0.373 
 46-50 -0.034 0.088 1.000 -0.306 0.239 
 51-55 -0.043 0.078 1.000 -0.284 0.198 
 60+ -0.199 0.106 0.631 -0.530 0.131 
 18-25 0.296 0.096 0.056 -0.004 0.596 
 26-30 .4064
* 0.102 0.002 0.090 0.723 
 31-35 .3870
* 0.113 0.018 0.037 0.737 
60+ 36-40 0.309 0.124 0.241 -0.078 0.696 
 41-45 0.281 0.119 0.309 -0.090 0.652 
 46-50 0.166 0.115 0.881 -0.191 0.522 
 51-55 0.157 0.107 0.873 -0.177 0.490 
 56-60 0.199 0.106 0.631 -0.131 0.530 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .369. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 25. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
18-25 1.7989 .72610 404 
26-30 1.7500 .64932 186 
31-35 1.9390 .80890 86 
36-40 1.7452 .52039 52 
41-45 1.7738 .60860 63 
46-50 1.7305 .44752 77 
51-55 1.7353 .64792 119 
56-60 1.6752 .58615 127 
60+ 1.5909 .65833 44 
Total 1.7651 .66732 1158 
 
Table 26. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
5.688a 8 .711 1.603 .119 .011 
Intercept 2324.267 1 2324.267 5241.083 .000 .820 
Age 5.688 8 .711 1.603 .119 .011 
Error 509.548 1149 .443    
Total 4123.125 1158     
Corrected Total 515.236 1157     
a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = .004) 
 
Table 27. Multiple Comparisons. 
Dependent Variable:   PP  
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 26-30 0.049 0.059 0.996 -0.135 0.232 
18-25 31-35 -0.140 0.079 0.701 -0.386 0.106 
 36-40 0.054 0.098 1.000 -0.251 0.359 
 41-45 0.025 0.090 1.000 -0.255 0.305 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 46-50 0.068 0.083 0.996 -0.189 0.326 
18-25 51-55 0.064 0.069 0.992 -0.152 0.279 
 56-60 0.124 0.068 0.665 -0.087 0.334 
 60+ 0.208 0.106 0.567 -0.121 0.537 
 18-25 -0.049 0.059 0.996 -0.232 0.135 
 31-35 -0.189 0.087 0.422 -0.459 0.081 
 36-40 0.005 0.104 1.000 -0.320 0.329 
26-30 41-45 -0.024 0.097 1.000 -0.326 0.278 
 46-50 0.020 0.090 1.000 -0.261 0.300 
 51-55 0.015 0.078 1.000 -0.228 0.258 
 56-60 0.075 0.077 0.988 -0.163 0.313 
 60+ 0.159 0.112 0.888 -0.188 0.506 
 18-25 0.140 0.079 0.701 -0.106 0.386 
 26-30 0.189 0.087 0.422 -0.081 0.459 
 36-40 0.194 0.117 0.773 -0.170 0.557 
31-35 41-45 0.165 0.110 0.858 -0.178 0.508 
 46-50 0.208 0.104 0.547 -0.116 0.533 
 51-55 0.204 0.094 0.432 -0.089 0.497 
 56-60 0.264 0.093 0.106 -0.025 0.553 
 60+ 0.348 0.123 0.111 -0.036 0.732 
 18-25 -0.054 0.098 1.000 -0.359 0.251 
 26-30 -0.005 0.104 1.000 -0.329 0.320 
 31-35 -0.194 0.117 0.773 -0.557 0.170 
36-40 41-45 -0.029 0.125 1.000 -0.416 0.359 
 46-50 0.015 0.120 1.000 -0.357 0.386 
 51-55 0.010 0.111 1.000 -0.334 0.354 
 56-60 0.070 0.110 0.999 -0.271 0.411 
 60+ 0.154 0.136 0.969 -0.270 0.578 
 18-25 -0.025 0.090 1.000 -0.305 0.255 
 26-30 0.024 0.097 1.000 -0.278 0.326 
 31-35 -0.165 0.110 0.858 -0.508 0.178 
41-45 36-40 0.029 0.125 1.000 -0.359 0.416 
 46-50 0.043 0.113 1.000 -0.308 0.395 
 51-55 0.039 0.104 1.000 -0.284 0.361 
 56-60 0.099 0.103 0.989 -0.220 0.418 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
(I) Age (J) Age 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
41-45 60+ 0.183 0.131 0.899 -0.224 0.590 
 18-25 -0.068 0.083 0.996 -0.326 0.189 
 26-30 -0.020 0.090 1.000 -0.300 0.261 
 31-35 -0.208 0.104 0.547 -0.533 0.116 
46-50 36-40 -0.015 0.120 1.000 -0.386 0.357 
 41-45 -0.043 0.113 1.000 -0.395 0.308 
 51-55 -0.005 0.097 1.000 -0.308 0.298 
 56-60 0.055 0.096 1.000 -0.244 0.354 
 60+ 0.140 0.126 0.973 -0.252 0.531 
 18-25 -0.064 0.069 0.992 -0.279 0.152 
 26-30 -0.015 0.078 1.000 -0.258 0.228 
 31-35 -0.204 0.094 0.432 -0.497 0.089 
51-55 36-40 -0.010 0.111 1.000 -0.354 0.334 
 41-45 -0.039 0.104 1.000 -0.361 0.284 
 46-50 0.005 0.097 1.000 -0.298 0.308 
 56-60 0.060 0.085 0.999 -0.204 0.324 
 60+ 0.144 0.118 0.950 -0.221 0.510 
 18-25 -0.124 0.068 0.665 -0.334 0.087 
 26-30 -0.075 0.077 0.988 -0.313 0.163 
 31-35 -0.264 0.093 0.106 -0.553 0.025 
56-60 36-40 -0.070 0.110 0.999 -0.411 0.271 
 41-45 -0.099 0.103 0.989 -0.418 0.220 
 46-50 -0.055 0.096 1.000 -0.354 0.244 
 51-55 -0.060 0.085 0.999 -0.324 0.204 
 60+ 0.084 0.116 0.998 -0.278 0.446 
 18-25 -0.208 0.106 0.567 -0.537 0.121 
 26-30 -0.159 0.112 0.888 -0.506 0.188 
 31-35 -0.348 0.123 0.111 -0.732 0.036 
60+ 36-40 -0.154 0.136 0.969 -0.578 0.270 
 41-45 -0.183 0.131 0.899 -0.590 0.224 
 46-50 -0.140 0.126 0.973 -0.531 0.252 
 51-55 -0.144 0.118 0.950 -0.510 0.221 
  56-60 -0.084 0.116 0.998 -0.446 0.278 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .443.  
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Table 27 (Continued) 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
  
Educational Level 
Results pertaining to SMU, IPE, EPE and PP among respondents at different education 
levels are presented in Table 28 to 36. Although no significant difference was found in SMU, 
IPE and EPE across education levels, significant differences were found in PP between college 
students (mean = 2.980) and those who had attained a bachelor’s (mean = 1.977) or a master’s 
degree (mean = 1.928).  
Table 28. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
Education Mean Std. Deviation N 
High School 1.8991 .82332 108 
College 1.8865 .69836 148 
Bachelor's 1.9767 .71827 695 
Master's 1.9280 .65261 182 
Doctoral 2.0160 .74927 25 
Total 1.9511 .71675 1158 
 
Table 29. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   SMU   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
1.568a 4 .392 .762 .550 .003 
Intercept 1496.627 1 1496.627 2910.823 .000 .716 
Education 1.568 4 .392 .762 .550 .003 
Error 592.826 1153 .514    
Total 5002.760 1158     
Corrected Total 594.394 1157     
a. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001) 
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Table 30. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Education Mean Std. Deviation N 
High School 2.8466 .74056 108 
College 2.9797 .67419 148 
Bachelor's 2.9772 .70541 695 
Master's 3.0463 .80097 182 
Doctoral 3.0057 .81804 25 
Total 2.9768 .72357 1158 
 
Table 31. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   IPE   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
2.734a 4 .683 1.307 .266 .005 
Intercept 3505.768 1 3505.768 6703.279 .000 .853 
Education 2.734 4 .683 1.307 .266 .005 
Error 603.011 1153 .523    
Total 10867.224 1158     
Corrected Total 605.744 1157     
a. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .001) 
 
Table 32. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Education Mean Std. Deviation N 
High School 3.1500 .52391 108 
College 3.1770 .60633 148 
Bachelor's 3.1871 .61715 695 
Master's 3.1758 .65803 182 
Doctoral 3.3360 .59363 25 
Total 3.1838 .61337 1158 
 
Table 33. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   EPE   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .728a 4 .182 .483 .748 .002 
Intercept 4079.938 1 4079.938 10824.966 .000 .904 
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Table 33 (Continued) 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Education .728 4 .182 .483 .748 .002 
Error 434.567 1153 .377    
Total 12173.200 1158     
Corrected Total 435.295 1157     
a. R Squared = .002 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002) 
 
Table 34. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Education Mean Std. Deviation N 
High School 1.7083 .75156 108 
College 1.6166 .57099 148 
Bachelor's 1.7921 .69018 695 
Master's 1.8242 .60328 182 
Doctoral 1.7100 .48240 25 
Total 1.7651 .66732 1158 
 
Table 35. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Dependent Variable:   PP   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
4.831a 4 1.208 2.728 .028 .009 
Intercept 1188.930 1 1188.930 2685.784 .000 .700 
Education 4.831 4 1.208 2.728 .028 .009 
Error 510.405 1153 .443    
Total 4123.125 1158     
Corrected Total 515.236 1157     
a. R Squared = .009 (Adjusted R Squared = .006) 
 
Table 36. Multiple Comparisons. 
Dependent Variable:   PP 
Tukey HSD 
(I) 
Education (J) Education 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
High School College 0.0918 0.08420 0.812 -0.1383 0.3218 
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Table 36 (Continued) 
(I) 
Education (J) Education 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
High School Bachelor's -0.0838 0.06882 0.741 -0.2718 0.1043 
  Master's -0.1158 0.08082 0.606 -0.3366 0.105 
  Doctoral -0.0017 0.14767 1.000 -0.4051 0.4018 
College High School -0.0918 0.0842 0.812 -0.3218 0.1383 
  Bachelor's -.1755* 0.06023 0.030 -0.3401 -0.011 
  Master's -.2076* 0.07364 0.039 -0.4088 -0.0064 
  Doctoral -0.0934 0.14387 0.967 -0.4865 0.2996 
Bachelor's High School 0.0838 0.06882 0.741 -0.1043 0.2718 
  College .1755* 0.06023 0.03 0.011 0.3401 
  Master's -0.0321 0.0554 0.978 -0.1834 0.1193 
  Doctoral 0.0821 0.13544 0.974 -0.2879 0.4521 
Master's High School 0.1158 0.08082 0.606 -0.105 0.3366 
  College .2076* 0.07364 0.039 0.0064 0.4088 
  Bachelor's 0.0321 0.0554 0.978 -0.1193 0.1834 
  Doctoral 0.1142 0.14191 0.929 -0.2735 0.5019 
Doctoral High School 0.0017 0.14767 1.000 -0.4018 0.4051 
  College 0.0934 0.14387 0.967 -0.2996 0.4865 
  Bachelor's -0.0821 0.13544 0.974 -0.4521 0.2879 
  Master's -0.1142 0.14191 0.929 -0.5019 0.2735 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .443. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISSCUTION  
 
This study focused on investigating the relationship between social media use, political 
efficacy, and political participation in mainland China. In particular, it examines the mediating 
role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation. The two 
dimensions of political efficacy measured in this study were internal political efficacy and 
external political efficacy. These are the two primary dimensions of political efficacy studied by 
previous scholars examining this research topic (Balch, 1974; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; 
Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009).   
Table 37. Summary of Hypotheses Testing. 
Hypothesis Relationship Rationale Results 
H1 SMUàIPE Direct Effect Support 
H2 SMUàEPE Direct Effect Support 
H3 IPEàPP Direct Effect Support 
H4 EPEàPP Direct Effect Not Support 
H5 SUMàIPE àPP Indirect (mediated) Effect Support 
H6 SMUàEPEàPP Indirect (mediated) Effect Not Support 
 
For the current study, 1159 Chinese participants responded to the questionnaires via the 
online survey platform Askform. The research goal was to test the validity of the previously 
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discussed structural equation model. The first part of the model is SMUàIPEàPP, and the 
second part is SMUàEPEàPP. The main findings are presented below.   
The first phase was to analyze the process of SMUàIPE. Results indicate SMU directly 
influences IPE (SMUàIPE, r =0.52). This finding suggests that Chinese people who use more 
social media for political information and engagement have higher internal political efficacy than 
those who use it less. It is possible that Chinese people who are highly engaged in social media 
related to political issues think they have enough capability to participate in politics (Caprara, 
Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009; Sullivan & Riedel, 2001).  
Based on the scale of political social media use, many factors influence Chinese adults’ 
internal political efficacy. These factors include frequency of reading hard news, posting political 
videos and photos, voting online, writing blogs about current events, joining political topic 
discussions, expressing opinions about politics or governments, following official government 
social media accounts, and interacting with government representatives on social media (Zhang 
& Lin, 2014).  
Based on uses and gratifications theory, individuals’ motivations for using social media 
related to politics are for seeking political information and guidance (Kaye & Johnson, 2002). It 
is probable that political behaviors, knowledge, discussion, and participation are related to social 
media use. Based on the literature review, interpersonal discussion and media consumption are 
significant factors in political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele & Nisbet, 
2002). Especially, social networking sites use promotes users’ knowledge about political 
campaigns (Gottfried et al., 2016). In order to development of political social media in China, 
Chinese government officials established more than 53,546 official accounts on Weibo to 
disseminate political information, policies, and communicate with citizens (Statistical Report on 
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Internet Development in China, 2017). This situation also provides more opportunities to 
Chinese citizens to know political information and knowledge. Political knowledge, in turn, is 
the central influence on individuals’ political efficacy and actual political participation (Galston, 
2001). Furthermore, various social media outlets provide more freedom to Chinese people to 
become grassroots reporters to express their opinions about politics (Zhou, 2009). For example, 
Chinese citizens can comment on recent political events and governmental policies and even 
report governmental officials’ corrupt behaviors. Consequently, social media consumption about 
politics can promote Chinese adults’ internal political efficacy in the current sociopolitical 
environment.   
The second phase of the first part (SMUàIPEàPP) of this study found that IPE directly 
influenced PP (IPEàPP, r = 0.40). The result revealed that internal political efficacy has a 
positive relationship with political participation. This indicates that Chinese people who have 
higher internal political efficacy are more likely to engage in politics, which is consistent with 
other studies (Morrell, 2003; Gastil & Xenos, 2010).  
Self-efficacy can increase self-confidence and empowering behaviors, which can help 
people to achieve their goals (Bandura, 1994; Sherer et al., 1982). In the case of politics, political 
self-efficacy facilitates confidences in the political realm, including increasing their participation 
in political activities. Individuals who have high-level self-efficacy tend to have positive 
expectations of outcomes of behaviors, which motivates his or her actions (Bandura, 1994).  
Because the Chinese political environment is authoritarian and conservative (Siebert, 
1956), Chinese people generally lack opportunities for political expression and activities. 
However, the Chinese people who have high internal political efficacy will actively participate in 
some political activities that are approved by the Chinese government, such as discussing politics 
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with friends and colleagues, signing petition letters, joining demonstrations, and connecting with 
official media to report or discuss political events (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Consequently, the 
Chinese people’s internal political efficacy has a positive relationship with political participation.   
The third phase of the first part (SMUàIPEàPP) of this study found that SMU directly 
influenced IPE, and IPE directly influenced PP. Consequently, IPE is the mediated variable 
between SMU and PP. The result revealed that individuals who use more social media related to 
politics have high-level internal efficacy, which leads them to participate in politics. Additionally, 
political knowledge is positively related to social media use (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 
2012).  
Information seeking is the basic reason that people use Internet and social media 
(Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). Social media use can increase users’ knowledge and the degree of 
understanding about a specific realm. In China, Wechat use can help users understand political 
events and motivate them to participate in politics (Chen, 2017). Although, some scholars argue 
that political knowledge increases voting behavior (Delli Carpini＆Keeter, 1996; Milner, 2007), 
political knowledge cannot be proven to directly influence political participation (Reichert, 2016). 
However, based on the results of previous study, political internal efficacy is a significant 
mediating variable to motivate people to engage in politics (Reichert, 2016). Thus, the internal 
political efficacy is the pathway that transits political knowledge to political behaviors. Therefore, 
internal political efficacy plays mediating role between social media use and political efficacy.  
In the first phase of the second part of model (SMUàEPEàPP), SMU directly influenced 
EPE (SMUàEPE, r = 0.18). The result indicated that if Chinese people use more social media 
related to politics, they will have a higher level external political efficacy than the people who 
use less. However, the influence of SMU on EPE was weaker than on IPE (r = 0.52). This result 
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is consistent with previous studies indicating online political communication influences internal 
political efficacy rather than external political efficacy (Lee, 2006).  
In addition, the sociopolitical environment of the particular country influences citizens’ 
external efficacy to a large extent. External political efficacy is positively associated with 
political trust toward government (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). Likewise, positive assessments and 
attitudes toward government can increase people’s political efficacy (Gastil et al., 2008; Gastil & 
Xenos, 2010). Under the Chinese political system, all types of media are controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This one party political reality restrains Chinese media, such 
as reducing truth for reporting and shielding sensitive anti-government ideas. In this context, 
citizens probably do not have enough positive attitudes toward the Chinese government, which 
leads to low external political efficacy likely due to restrictive governmental control regarding 
social media content.  
In the second phase of the second part of the model, EPE had no significantly direct effect 
on PP (EPEàPP, r = 0.04, sig = 0.172). There was no significant relationship between external 
political efficacy and political participation. Although EPE and PP have the weak relationship in 
few studies (Gamson, 1968; Pollock, 1983; Finkel, 1985), this finding of current research 
corresponds to the previous research literature (Gil de Zúñiga , Diehl, & Ardévol-Abreu, 2017，
Green & Shachar., 2000; Dyck & Lascher, 2009; Valentino et al., 2009).  
In the third phase of the second part of the model (SMUàEPEàPP), there was 
insufficient support for the process of SMUàEPEàPP. SMUàEPE was supported, but 
EPEàPP was not supported. Consequently, the EPE did not mediate SMU and PP.  
First, based on the statistical results, EPE was almost neutral (Mean = 3.184). Under the 
Chinese political system, two realities likely cause this result. First, the reform and opening 
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policy has encouraged an expanding market economy since 1978. Chinese citizens have seen a 
significant improvement in their standard of living since the reform and opening-up policy. In 
general, the population has a positive attitude toward government economic policies and actions 
(Hope, Yang, & Li, 2003). However, many people are dissatisfied with government in other 
realms, including environmental problems, governmental officials’ corruption, and the lack of 
actual political participation (Tian, 2016). Additionally, citizens cannot easily know the accurate 
information about government from traditional media outlets (Tai & Sun, 2007). However, social 
media provides more opportunities for citizens to know and understand political information, 
governmental affairs, and new policies. Because exposure to government and the Chinese 
Communist Party on social media has both positive and negative aspects, citizens can understand 
political issues from multiple perspectives through social media. For example, Chinese citizens 
acting as grassroots reporters can report on or repost governmental information and monitor 
governmental officials via social media. They can post the negative reports related to 
government officials. This trend decentralizes and challenges the control and censorship of 
central government (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). This encourages citizens to critically 
evaluate government policies and officials rather than accept only positive state-approved 
perspectives.   
Second, under the Chinese political system, citizens have limited access to engage in 
politics. This social climate leads to low citizens’ political participation. Political participation is 
influenced by Chinese sociopolitical culture and historical factors (Hou, 2011). Confucian 
culture advocated centralized political system from Qin Dynasty (BC 221) (Bachman, 1993). 
The emperor and central government controlled all local governments and people. People did not 
have the right to decide who administrated country or local governments. Although China has 
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had a democratic revolution from the past to now, Chinese political participation is still limited. 
Compared to the United States, Chinese citizens have limited accesses to actual political 
participation.  
Non-governmental organizations are important bridges that connect governments and 
citizens (De Tocqueville, 1850). However, Confucian culture emphasized that citizens should not 
organize non-governmental political groups (Liang, 2014). Although the current constitution of 
China protects citizens’ right to organize associations, and the CCP also controls the influence of 
non-government political organizations. On the other hand), Confucian culture continues to have 
considerable influence on Chinese people’s thoughts. Additionally, states of USA can 
independently administrate. However, the provinces in China need to control by central 
government (CCP), which is one of the reasons to lead corruption (Lin, 2014).  
The additional findings are related to gender, age, and educational level. First, SMU, IPE, 
and PP statistical means are higher for male respondents than for female respondents. Although 
gender equality is spreading globally, males generally retain dominant positions in economic and 
political realms across the world (Mayer & Schmidt, 2004). Most Chinese citizens have the 
perception that males control the political sphere even though there is a similar degree of gender-
based political participation. According to Sangwha (1999), Chinese patriarchy is also a factor in 
gender inequality in the political realm. Based on the historical and cultural context, traditional 
Confucian culture continues to dominate Chinese people’s societal awareness and values. 
Confucianism has promoted a dominant male role in both public and private spheres. Both 
publically and privately, females are expected to obey male authority. Under this system, 
Chinese females lack the social status and resources to achieve equality (Sangwha, 1999). In the 
political realm, this dynamic results in a gender gap regarding political participation, which 
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brings more difficulties for women and reduces their interest in political engagement 
(Beauregard, 2014).      
However, only the EPE statistical mean in the current study is slightly higher for female 
than the mean of male. In 1978, the reform and opening policy pressured the Chinese 
Communist Party to address the existing condition of extreme gender inequality (Sangwha, 
1999). This development, combined with the need for an increased labor force to improve the 
Chinese economy, resulted in increased female employment. Chinese females have gradually 
become more prominent in the political, economic, cultural, and technological realms. In the 
political realm, Chinese females now have more access to know political knowledge and have 
more opportunities for civic participation than ever before (Mayer & Schmidt, 2004). 
Consequently, Chinese females probably owe their public development to government policies. 
Not surprisingly, most females have a positive attitude toward government.  
For age, explaining the comparable findings of different age brackets—only the 
comparison between 31-35 years old and 56-60 years old is valid for SMU. The mean of 31-35 
for SMU is higher than 56-60 (31-35 = 2.1407; 56-60 = 1.8276). In general, the SMU statistical 
mean for younger adults from 18 to 45 are higher than older adults from 46 to 60 and above. For 
these results, the age was negatively related to SMU. The older people are, the less SMU will be. 
According to the social media landscape of China (2016), social media users who are 18 to 35 
comprise about 70% of all social media users. People over 40 years old comprise only 18% of 
users. Chinese young adults use more social media to seek political information or participating 
in politics than older adults. Older adults may use more traditional media than social media to 
obtain political news.  
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For IPE, the age brackets of 51-55 and over 60 had higher statistical means than other age 
brackets (51-55 = 3.2269; 60+ = 3.2143). In general, the IPE statistical means for 46 to 60 and 
above age brackets is higher than that people in the age group 18 to 45. Based on the age 
brackets comparisons, 18 to 25 have significant IPE differences from the age brackets 46-50, 51-
55, 56-6-, and 60 and above. The age bracket 26 to 30 also has significant differences from those 
in age group 51-55, 56-60, and 60 and above. These results mean that older adults have higher 
internal political efficacy than young adults, and it also support that IPE increases with 
advancing age. 
According to these results, age is positively associated with IPE. The older people are, the 
higher IPE they have. Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) also indicated older voters have 
higher information political efficacy than younger voters. This finding suggests that internal 
political efficacy has a positive relationship with age. Consequently, political information and 
knowledge is an important part of internal political efficacy. Moreover, based on the above 
results and literature review, knowledge, interest, interpersonal discussion, media consumption, 
and income are factors in political information efficacy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele 
& Nisbet, 2002). Possibly because older Chinese adults have more political media consumption, 
knowledge, and discussion involvement than younger voters, their political efficacy is higher 
than younger voters.  
The EPE statistical means increases with age from 18-25 to 60 and above (18-25 = 3.1634; 
26-30 = 3.0527; 31-35 = 3.0721; 36-40 = 3.1500; 41-45 = 3.1778; 46-50 = 3.2935; 51-55 = 
3.3025; 56-60 = 3.2598; 60+ = 3.4591). The statistical difference is especially significant 
between 26-30 and 51-55, and between 26-30 and 60 and above. This result also clarifies that 
older adults have higher EPE than young adults in China. In general, EPE increases with 
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increasing of age. External political efficacy is the citizens’ attitudes toward government 
institutions and officials, and also refers to people’s confidence of knowing government affairs 
(Niemi et al., 1990). Young adults are significantly more likely to think that public officials do 
not care what they think, and believe they have no say about government (Kaid, McKinney, & 
Tedesco, 2007). Because Chinese older adults have more political knowledge about government 
affairs than younger adults via multiple media outlets, older adults generally have higher scores 
on measures of government knowledge than younger adults.  
In addition, when this study measured Chinese people’s attitudes toward the government, 
older adults seemed more cautious and less critical of the Chinese government than younger 
adults. This is likely because they have a deeper understanding of Chinese government 
operations. These older citizens know the established social rules regarding freedom of 
expression and rigorous censorship (Shambaugh, 2007). Some of older adults who are members 
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worry that the government will investigate them if they 
express negative attitudes toward CCP and government. This may explain why older adults have 
a higher level in EPE.   
By contrast, there was not a statistically significant difference in political participation 
among age brackets (sig > 0.05). However, earlier studies examined found that older Chinese 
citizens are more likely to engage in local politics (Xu, Perkins, & Chow, 2010). Other factors 
may account for these age differences, such as geography, income, marital status, and 
educational level. Consequently, age cannot be separated from other factors when analyzing 
political participation in China.  
Third, in terms of educational levels, there was non-significant relationship with SMU, 
IPE, and EPE (sig > 0.05). However, educational level is related to PP. The results indicated 
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significant differences between individuals with college educations and those with university 
bachelor and master educations. (In China, colleges are lower level educational institutions than 
universities). To some extent, educational level positively influences political participation in 
China. According to Lv (2014), educational level has an independent significant effect on 
political participation in China. Higher educational level is a strong predictor of political 
participation (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011). Chinese people with a higher educational level tend to 
have higher information literacy and a better understanding of political information. This 
encourages engagement in political activities, such as online poll participation (Zhao & Leung, 
2013). University educated individuals often have higher information literacy in political 
information, and have more passionate and deeper understanding, than people who are college 
educated. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study focuses on analyzing the relationship among social media use, political 
efficacy, and political participation. The main purpose is examining the mediating role of 
political efficacy between social media use and political participation.  
Based on the above findings, this study provides some implications for academic 
researchers. There are no previous studies examining the mediating role of political efficacy 
between social media use and political participation in China. However, this study revealed 
internal political efficacy as the mediating role between social media use and political 
participation. But external political efficacy does not mediate between social media use and 
political participation in the Chinese context. Internal political efficacy allows people to trust 
themselves to participate in politics. The internal political efficacy serves as a pathway to 
transfer political knowledge and interest into actual political behaviors (Reichert, 2016). This 
result also provides a theoretical support to the process of self-efficacy transferring to behaviors 
(Bandura, 1977).  
Additionally, the demographic results of this study also contribute to the theoretical 
framework in the political research realm. Based on findings of gender, Chinese males use social 
media related to politics more often than females, leading to higher internal political efficacy and 
political participation among males. Only females’ external political efficacy levels are higher 
than males’. According to findings of age comparison, younger adults have more social media 
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use behaviors than older adults. Older adults have higher internal political efficacy and external 
political efficacy than younger adults. Age has no direct relationship with political participation. 
Based on the educational level results, educational level is not associated with social media use, 
internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy. It is, however, related to political 
participation. Chinese people who have higher education are more likely to be politically 
participates. The above findings have theoretical implications for political research designed to 
investigate similar issues and related questions.  
This study also has some practical implications for Chinese government officials, 
journalists and citizens. Government officials and journalists can use the study findings to 
improve the political dissemination of information and to engage citizens in civic participation. 
Because young people are target audiences of social media related to politics, government 
officials and journalists should use young people’s methods of expression to disseminate political 
information, including using the popular words and lively engagement on political social media. 
In addition, the government can also improve Chinese citizens’ internal political efficacy via 
social media due to the positive relationship between social media use and internal political 
efficacy. Furthermore, government should organize certain political activities on social media, 
and journalists can use social media to help the government to organize political activities. 
Together, such actions should provide Chinese citizens with more political opportunities and 
access to full engagement in politics.  
This study also provides valuable information to Chinese citizens. Chinese citizens can 
use this study to understand how social media use can improve their political knowledge and 
internal political efficacy. They will increase their focuses and purposes when they seek political 
information or knowledge on social media. In addition, when they understand the role of internal 
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political efficacy in the process of political participation, Chinese citizens may have more 
confidence to participate in politics.  
Although this study has multiple implications for academic and practical realms, it also 
has limitations. First, this study does not examine the correlation between variables. All 
relationships are one way rather than interrelationships. Second, this study did not analyze the 
relationship between internal and external political efficacy. In addressing these first two 
limitations, there is a study that found that political efficacy directly influences political news use 
(Gottfried, Hardy, Holbert, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2017). It also analyzed the relationship between 
internal and external political efficacy. Third, the future questionnaire should contain following 
questions: “Do you use social media?” and “Do you have social media accounts?”. These 
questions will filter out participants who do not use social media.  
Future studies should expand on the present study. First, investigating the correlation 
between variables is necessary. Second, future studies also need to classify different kinds of 
social media related to politics (e.g. friendship, communities, and knowledge websites), and 
examine who are the major audiences of different types of political social media (Shiratuddin 
et.al., 2017). Third, because some scholars use the scale of internal political efficacy instead of 
scale of political information efficacy, future studies need to clarify the specific definition of 
political information efficacy and develop an accurate scale to measure it (Painter, 2011; Weaver 
Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011; Tedesco, 2011). These steps are necessary for future 
scholars to better understand the social and theoretical roles of political efficacy, both in China 
and elsewhere.  
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE: ENGLISH VERSION 
 
The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy Between Social Media Use and Political 
Participation in China. 
 
Hello: 
     We sincerely invite you to participate in the research of "The Mediating Role of Political 
Efficacy Between Social Media Use and Political Participation in China." If you are 18 years old 
and older, and agree to participate in this survey, you will complete the following questionnaire 
through the online platform. This investigation is not registered and your personal information 
will be kept confidentially. You have the right do not to participate in this survey, and you also 
have the right to exit during the process. 
1. Social media use about politics. 
Score statement: This part is related to frequency of following behaviors. Each question has five 
grades. (1: never; 2: rarely; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5 always.) 
(1) I read hard news via social media. 
(2) I repost photos or videos clips on government or politics. 
(3) I upload photos or videos shot by yourself on non-recreational latest events.  
(4) I vote online.  
(5) I write blogs on government or politics, such as politics, economics, or international relations. 
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(6) I join topic discussions of politics via social media 
(7) I post political issues on social media and seek help or discussion.  
(8) I express opinions explicitly on government and politics via social media.  
(9) I follow and interact with official Social media accounts of governmental or political 
institutions. 
(10) I organize non-governmental campaigns or activities via social media. 
2. Internal political efficacy 
Score statement: This part is related to the degree of agreement of following questions. Each 
question has five grades. The more you agree, the score is higher. (1: strongly disagree 2: 
disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5: disagree.) 
(1) I know more about politics than most people my age 
(2) When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say 
(3) I am able to understand most political issues easily.  
(4) I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.  
(5) I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country. 
(6) I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
(7) I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. 
3. External political efficacy 
Score statement: This part is related to the degree of agreement of following questions. Each 
question has five grades. The more you agree, the score is higher. (1: strongly disagree 2: 
disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5:disagree.) 
(1) I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think. 
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(2) The government cares a lot about what all of us think about new laws. 
(3) The government is doing its best to find out what people want. 
(4) The powerful leaders in government care very little about the opinions of people.  
(5) When people get together to demand change, the leaders in government listen. 
4. Political participation 
Score statement: This part is related to frequency of following behaviors. Each question has five 
grades. It is more frequent when your score is higher. (1: never; 2:rarely; 3: sometimes; 4:often; 
5 always.) 
(1) I discuss politics with friends or colleagues 
(2) I sign petition letters 
(3) I join demonstrations that are not organized by party officials  
(4) I contact official media to cover the event 
5. Demographic information 
(1) Your gender:  
A: male B: female 
(2) Your age:  
A18 ~ 25 B 26 ~ 30 C 31 ~ 35 D 36 ~ 40 E 41~ 45 F46 ~ 50 G 51~ 55   
H 56 ~ 60   I over 60  
(3) Your province:  
A Anhui B Beijing C Chongqing D Fujian E Gansu F Guangdong   
G Guangxi H Guizhou I Hainan J Hebei K Heilongjiang L Henan   
M Hong Kong N Hubei O Hunan P Jiangsu Q Jiangxi R Jilin  
S Liaoning T Macao U Inner Mongolia V Ningxia W Qinghai X Shandong  
 88 
Y Shanghai Z Shanxi A1 Shanxi B1 Sichuan C1 Tianjin D1 Xinjiang 
E1 Xizang F1 Yunnan G1 Zhejiang H1 Overseas 
(4) Your occupation: 
A Full-time Students B Production C Sale D Marketing/PR   
E Customer Service F Administration/ Support G Human Resources   
H Finance/Audit I Civilian J Technology K Management   
L Professor or Teacher M Consulting   N Professionals (Accountants, Layers,  
Architects, Healthcare, Journalists, and artists etc.)  O Other  
Thank you for participating in this survey. Have a good day! Goodbye! 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE: CHINESE VERSION 
中国⼈的政治效能在使⽤社交媒体和政治参与中的作⽤ 
您好： 
我们诚挚邀请您参与“ 中国⼈的政治效能在使⽤社交媒体和政治参与中的作⽤” 的
调查研究。如果您是 18周岁及以上的成年⼈，并同意参与本次调查，您将通过⽹络平台
完成以下这份调查问卷。此调查为不记名调查，您的个⼈信息将被完全保密。您有权不参
加本次调查，也有权利在参与过程中选择退出。 
⼀ 使⽤社交媒体上与政治相关的功能和信息 
评分说明：这部分问题所问的是以下⾏为的频率，每题分数为 5个等级，分数越⾼表⽰越
频繁。（5分：总是；4分：经常；3分：有时候；2分：很少；1分：从不。）  
（1） 我通过社交媒体浏览政治性硬新闻。 
（2） 我在社交媒体上转发关于政治的图⽚和视频。 
（3） 我上传⾃⼰拍摄的有关最新事件的⾮娱乐性的照⽚和视频到社交媒体上。 
（4） 我参与社交媒体的在线投票。 
（5） 我写关于政治或政府的微博或博客，内容例如：政治，经济，或国际关系。 
（6） 我在社交媒体上参与有关政治的主题讨论。 
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（7） 我在社交媒体上发布和讨论⼀些政治性的问题，或对此寻求帮助。 
（8） 我在社交名媒体上明确地表述关于政府和政治地观点。 
（9） 我在社交媒体上关注政府或政治机构的的官⽅账户, 并与他们互动。 
（10）我在社交媒体上组织有关政治的民间活动。 
⼆ 内部的政治效能 
评分说明：这部分问题所问的是您对下列问题的同意程度。每题分数为 5个等级，分数越
⾼代表越同意。（5分：很同意；4分：同意；3分：中⽴；2分：不同意；1分：很不同
意） 
（1） 我⽐同龄⼈知道更多有关政治的事情。 
（2） 我经常可以在讨论政治问题的时候侃侃⽽谈 （有话可说）。 
（3） 我可以很容易地理解⼤多数政治问题。 
（4） 我认为我⾃⼰可以很好地参与政治。 
（5） 我感觉我可以对⾃⼰国家重要的政治问题有⾮常好的理解。 
（6） 我认为我⽐⼤多数⼈在在政治⽅⾯消息更灵通，更见多识⼴。 
（7） 我认为我可以在政府机关和政治的相关机构做的⽐其他⼈好。 
三 外部的政治效能 
评分说明： 这部分所问的是您对下列问题的同意程度。每题分数为 5个等级，分数越⾼
代表越同意。（5分：⾮常同意；3分：同意；3 分：中⽴；3 不同意；1 分：⾮常不同意） 
（1） 我不认为政府⼯作⼈员关⼼像我这样的⼈。 
（2） 我认为政府⾮常关⼼民众对新法律的看法。 
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（3） 我认为政府在尽最⼤努⼒找到⼈们群众想要什么。 
（4） 权⼒很⼤的政府领导⼈很少关⼼⼈民的意见。 
（5） 当⼈民群众集体要求改变时，政府的领导会响应⼤家的需求。 
四 政治参与 
评分说明：这部分问题所问的是以下⾏为的频率，每题分数为 5个等级，分数越⾼表⽰越
频繁。（5分：总是；4分：经常；3分：有时候；2分：很少；1分：从不。） 
（1） 我和朋友或同事讨论政治。 
（2） 我在请愿书上签字。 
（3） 我参与⾮政党官⽅组织的游⾏活动。 
（4） 我联系官⽅媒体报道事件。 
五 ⼈⼜统计基本信息 
（1） 您的性别： A 男    B ⼥ 
（2） 您的年龄： A 18~25岁  B 26~30岁 C 31~35岁 D 36~40岁 E 41~45岁 F 46~50 G 
51~55 岁  H 56~60岁 I 60岁以上 
（3） 您所在省份：A 安徽 B 北京 C 重庆 D 福建 E ⽢肃 F ⼴东 G ⼴西 H 贵州 I 海南 J 河
北 K⿊龙江 L河南 M ⾹港 N 湖北 O 湖南 P 江苏 Q 江西 R 吉林 S 辽宁 T 澳门 U 内蒙古 V 
宁夏W 青海 X ⼭东 Y 上海 Z ⼭西 A1 陕西 B1 四川 C1 天津 D1 新疆 E1西藏 F1云南 G1 
浙江 H1 海外 
（4） 您⽬前的职业：A 全⽇制学⽣ B ⽣产⼈员  C 销售⼈员 D 市场／公关⼈员 E 客服⼈
员  F ⾏政／后勤⼈员 G ⼈⼒资源  H 财务／审计⼈员 I ⽂职／办事⼈员 J 技术／研发⼈员 
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K 管理⼈员  L 教师 M 顾问／咨询 N 专业⼈⼠（如会计师，律师，建筑师，医护⼈员，记
者，⽂艺⼯作者等） O 其他  
（5） 您⽬前的学历：A ⾼中及以下 B⼤专 E 本科 F 研究⽣ G 博⼠及以上学位 
感谢您参与本次问卷调查，祝您⽣活愉快！再见！ 
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